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Shields-Stiefel: A Time To Live

A TIME TO LIVE, A TIME TO DIE
INTRODUCTION

[T]he liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it
protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.'
For the past ten years, 2 the Ohio General Assembly has struggled to pass a
living will statute. Legislators have introduced bills in both the Senate and the House
of Representatives during each of the last five sessions.' Unfortunately, none of
these bills has become law, and Ohio's part-time legislators 4 will try again to enact
a living will statute during the 119th General Assembly. The 132 legislators5 are
valiantly attempting to pass such a bill during this General Assembly. Rep. Guthrie6
introduced H.B. 70 in the House of Representatives during this term. Sen.
Montgomery' introduced S.B. 1 in the Ohio Senate. On February 5, 1991, this bill
successfully passed in the Senate with a vote of 28 to 5. S.B. 1 was referred to the
House of Representatives on February 7, 1991.
'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2857 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2
The first living will legislation was introduced in the Ohio Legislature in 1981.
3
The following bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives:
114th General Assembly, 1981-82, H.B. 137, Rep. Nettle
115th General Assembly, 1983-84, H.B. 331, Rep. Nettle
116th General Assembly, 1985-86, H.B. 220, Rep. Nettle
117th General Assembly, 1987-88, II.B. 896, Rep. Guthrie
118th General Assembly, 1989-90, H.B. 56, Rep. Guthrie
The following bills have been introduced in the Senate:
116th General Assembly, 1985-86, S.B. 72, Sen. Snyder
117th General Assembly, 1987-88, S.B. 148, Sen. Nettle
118th General Assembly, 1989-90, S.B. 379, Sen Nettle
S.B. 380, Sen. Zimmers
S.B. 383, Sen. Hobson
4
Each General Assembly lasts for two years--from January of one year through December of the next. The
legislators usually begin their session on the first Monday after the first Tuesday in January, and meet on
Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of scheduled weeks. (Telephone interview with the Legislative
Information Office (January 28, 1991).
'There are 99 State Representatives and 33 State Senators in the Ohio Legislature.
6
Representative Marc Guthrie, one of the major proponents of living wills, was elected to the Ohio
Legislature in 1982. He is the Assistant Majority Whip. During his tenure in office, Representative Guthrie
has served as the Vice Chairman of the Elections and Townships Committee and as a member of the Ways
and Means, House Insurance, and I louse Health and Retirement Committees. (Telephone interview with
Representative Guthrie's office (January 28, 1991).
7

Senator Betty Montgomery was first elected to the Ohio State Senate during the 118th General Assembly.
Senator Montgomery is from Perrysburg, Ohio and represents the Second Senate District. This is the first
living will legislation that Senator Montgomery has proposed. (Telephone interview with Senator
Montgomery's office (February 6, 1991).
' UNiFoRM Riirrs oF Thm Ti.minALLII.Y IL Acr (1989).
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The purpose of this Comment is to review S.B. 1 and to compare it to other
8
states living will statutes and to the proposed Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act.
Part I briefly overviews the American history of living wills. Part II reviews living
will/rightto die statutes in effect and major court decisions. Part III discusses Ohio's
position on the right to die, both statutory and judicial. Part IV reviews S.B. 1 and
suggests several changes. The conclusion recommends that a uniform living will

statute be enacted to guarantee equal treatment for patients in all jurisdictions.
PART I: BRIEF OvERViEw OF LIVING WILLs
State Legislation
California passed the first living will statute in 1976. 9 The term "living will"
was first used by Luis Kutner in 1969.10 It denotes a document in which a person can
make advance directives concerning the use ornon-use of life support systems." In

contrast, a durable power of attorney 12 is a document in which one person (referred
to as "principal") appoints anamed individual (referred to as "agent") to make health

care decisions for him if he becomes incompetent.' 3

Living will statutes were originally enacted 4 to permit persons in a persistent

9California Natural Death Act [1976], CAL. HEA.m & SAETy CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (Deering 1990). NOTE:

Forthe reader's information, the date upon which the statute was enacted is noted in parenthesis immediately
following the name of each statute.
"See Martyn & Jacobs,LegislatingAdvance Directivesforthe Terminally Ill: TheLiving Will andDurable
Power of Attorney, 63 NEn. L. Rav. 779, 787 (1984).
S"The life support system consists of a respirator, a nasogastric tube, and a catheter. The respirator is for
breathing and enters the body through a tube inserted in an incision in the trachea. The nasogastric tube is
for feeding and consists of a tube entering the nose and extending into the stomach. The catheter is for bladder
Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 3,426 N.E.2d 809, 810, (1980).
elimination."
'2 Health CarePowers ofAttorney, Commission on Legal Problems ofthe Elderly, A.B.A., Pub. Serv. Div.,
p. 1 (1990).
'3"Incompetency" is defined as:
Lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty. A relative term
which may be employed as meaning disqualification, inability, or incapacity and it can refer
to lack of legal qualifications or fitness to discharge the required duty and to show want of
physical or intellectual or moral fitness.
LAW DIcnoNARY 688-89 (5th ed. 1979).
BiAcK's
4
Many of the state statutes include a statement of purpose or legislative intent for the statute. See, e.g.,
Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act [1986], Il'w. R'.. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (1990):
§ 3271)-1. Purpose. The legislature finds that all competent persons have the fundamental
right to control the decisions relating to their own medical care, including the decision to
have medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong their lives provided,
withheld, or withdrawn. The legislature further finds that the artificial prolongation of life
for persons with a terminal condition may secure only a precarious and burdensome
existence, while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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vegetative state (PVS)' 5 or in a terminal' 6 condition to die a natural death rather than
to be kept alive by artificial means. This is a very commendable goal.
As of March, 1990, forty states plus the District of Columbia have enacted
living will/right to die statutes.' Twelve of these statutes authorize the appointment
In order that the rights of patients may be respected even after they are no longer able to
participate actively in decisions about themselves, the legislature hereby declares that the
laws of the State of Hawaii shall recognize the right of an adult person to make a written
declaration instructing his or herphysician to provide, withhold, or withdraw life-sustaining
procedures in the event of a terminal condition.
""A persistent vegetative state is one in which the patient is awake, but unconscious. He is unable to attend
to or provide for any of his needs. He is unable to sense pain." Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208,
209, 549 N.E.2d 571, 573 (1989).
"6 Although Ohio does not havea living will statute, it does have a Durable Power of Attorney Statute, Omo
Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.09 to 1337.17 (Anderson 1989). In that statute, "terminal condition" is defined
as "any illness or injury that is likely to result in imminent death, regardless of the type, nature, and amount
of health care that is provided." Oo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11 (1) (Anderson 1989).
'7 Presently effective living will/right to die statutes include: Alabama Natural Death Act [1981 ], ALA. CODE
§§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); Alaska Rights of Terminally m Act [1986] ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100
(1990); Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act [1985], A~z. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210(1989);
Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act [1987], ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17201 to -218 (1990); California Natural Death Act [1976], CAL. HEAMJ & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195
(DeeringSupp. 1990); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act [1985,1989], CoLo.R.v. STAT. §§ 15-18101 to -113 (1990); Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act [1985], CoNw. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a570 to -575 (West Supp. 1989); Delaware Patient's Right to Terminate Treatment Act [1982, 1983], DrE.
CODE ANN., tit. 16 §§ 2501 to 2509(1990); District of Columbia Natural Death Act of 1981 [1982], D.C.CoIE
ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1990); Florida Life-Prolonging Procedure Act [1984,1985,1990], FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 765.01 to -.15 (1989)(H.B. 513 enacted without signature June 30,1990); GeorgiaLiving Wills Act [1984,
1986, 1987, 19891, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1990); Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act
[1986], HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (1990); Idaho Natural Death Act [1977,1986, 1988], inAHoCoDE
§§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1990); Illinois Living Will Act [1984,1988], IL. RLV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,1 701 to 710
(1988); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act [1985], IND. CoDE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to
-22 (Burns 1990); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act [1985, 1987], IowA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11
(West 1989); Kansas NaturalDeathAct [1979], KAN.STAT.ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to28,109 (1988); Kentucky
Living Will Act [1990], Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 311.622 to .642 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Louisiana LifeSustaining Procedures Act [1984,1985], LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (S.B. 652 signed July
18 and H.B. 714 signed July 29, 1990); Maine Uniform Rights of the Terminally M Act [1985, 1990], Ms.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18a §§ 5-701 to 714 (H.B. 1497 signed April 17, 1990); Maryland Life-Sustaining
Procedures Act [1985, 1986,1987], MD. l[r.mALT-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1989); Minnesota Adult
Health Care Decisions Act [1989], MrN. STAT. §§ 145B.01 to .17 (1990); Mississippi Withdrawal of LifeSavings Mechanisms Act [1984], Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (1990); Missouri Life Support
Declarations Act [1985], Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon 1989); MontanaLiving Will Act [1985,
1989], MoNT. CoDE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to-104, -111, -201 to -206 (1989); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal
of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act [1977, 1985, 1987], NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.540 to .690 (Michie
1989); New Hampshire Terminal Care Document Act [1985], N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16
(1989); New Mexico Right to Die Act [1977,1984], N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to-I1 (1990); NorthCarolina
Right to Natural Death Act [1977,1979,1981,1983] N.C. Gmi. STAT. §§ 90-320to-322(1990); NorthDakota
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act [1989], N.D. Camr. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp. 1989); Oklahoma
Natural Death Act [1985, 1987, 1990], Oxi.A. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111 (1989) (H.B. 1482 signed May
25, 1990); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act [1977,1983], OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605 to
.650 (1989) (formerly §§ 97.050 to -.090); South Carolina Death with Dignity Act [1986,1988], S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1990); Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act [1985], TENN.
CoDEANN. §§ 32-11-101 to-I 10 (1990); UtahPersonal Choiceand Living Will Act [1985,1988],UTAHCODE
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of health care proxies or surrogates."8 Over half the states have enacted both living
will and durable powerof attorney forhealth care statutes.1 9 Nine states have enacted
failed
only durable power of attorney for health care statutes. 20 Only Nebraska has
21
to enact a living will or durable power of attorney for health care statute.
ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (1990); Vermont Terminal Care Document Act [1982], VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 5251 to 5262 and tit. 13, § 1801 (1989); Virginia Natural Death Act [1983,1988,19891, VA. Cone ANN.
§§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1990); Washington Natural Death Act [1979], WAsH. Rev. CorE ANN. §§ 70.122.010
to .905 (1990); West Virginia Natural Death Act [1984], W.VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1990); Wisconsin
Natural Death Act [1984,1986,1988], WLs. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (1988); Wyoming Act [1984, 1985,
1987], Wyo. ATAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1990).
" Statutes authorizing the appointment of health care proxies or surrogates include: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 2017-202 (1990); DEL. CoDE ANN., tit. 16, § 2502 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.05(2) (1989); IDAHo CoDe §
39-4504 (1990); IND. CoDE ANN. § 16-8-11-1 4 (g)( 2 ) (Burns 1990); IOWA CoDE ANN. § 144A.7(l)(a) (West
1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1, 5&3(c) (West 1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 18a, § 5-702(A)
(H.B. 1497 signed April 17,1990); MINN. STAT. § 145B.03 (1990); UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105, 1106
(1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(2) (1990); Wyo STA. § 35-22-102 (1990).
'9 States having both living will and durable power ofattorney statutes include: Alaska Statutory Form Power
of Attorney Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332 to .353 (1990); Arizona Power of Attorney Act, Amz. REv. STAT.
Am. §§ 14-5501 to -5502 (1989); California Statutory Form Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act,
CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2430 to 2444 (Deering Supp. 1990); Colorado Power of Attorney Act, CoLO. REv. STAT.
§§ 15-14-501 to -502 (1990); District of Columbia Health-Care Decisions Act, D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 21-2201
to -2213 (1990); Florida Durable Power of Attorney Act, FLA STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West 1989); Georgia
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (1990); Hawaii Uniform
Durable Power of Attorney Act, HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 551D-1 to -7 (1990); Illinois Power of Attorney for
Health Care Act, IL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 §§ 804-1 to -11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Iowa Power of
Attorney Act, IowA CoDE ANN. §§ 632.705 to 706 (West 1989); Kansas Durable Powerof Attorney for Health
Care Decisions Act, KANe. STAT. ANri. §§ 53-625 to -632 (1988); Kentucky Health Care Surrogate Act, Ky.
REv. STAT. §§ 311.970 to .986 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Maine Power of Attorney Act, ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A § 5-501 (Supp. 1989); Maryland Durable Power of Attorney Act, MD. EsT. & TRUSTs CoDE
ANN. §§ 13-601 to -603 (1989); Mississippi DurablePowerof Attorney forllealth Care Act, Miss. CoDEANN.
§ 41-41-151 to -183 (1990); Nevada Durable Power of Attorney Health Care Act, NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 449.800 to .860 (Michie 1989); New Mexico Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-501 to -502 (1990); North
CarolinaPowerof AttorneyAct, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-8 to -14 (1990); Oregon Durable Powerof Attorney
for Health Care Act, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.505 to .585 (1989); South Carolina Power of Attorney Act, S.C.
CoDE ANN. §§ 62-5-501 to -502 (H.B. 4444 signed May 14, 1990); Tennessee Durable Power of Attorney
for Health Care, TeNNm.
CoDE ANN. tit. 34, ch. 6 (H.B. 2345 signed April 9, 1990); Vermont Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, ch. 121 §§ 3451 to 3467 (1989); Virginia Durable
Power of Attorney Act, VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 11-9.1 to -9.4 (1990); Washington Durable Power of Attorney-Health Care Decisions Act, WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 11.94.010 to .050 (1990); West Virginia Medical
Power of Attorney Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30A-1 to -20 (1990); Wisconsin Power of Attorney for Health
Care
Act, 1989 Wis. Acr 200 (H.B. 305 signed April 12, 1990).
2
eStates having durable power of attorney for health care statutes include: Health Care-Decision-Making
Proxies, MAss. GEx. L. ch 332 of the Acts of 1990 (signed into law by Governor Michael Dukakis on
December 19, 1990); MicH. Compn.me L.AWs (H.B. 4016, Pub. Act 312, signed into law by Governor James
Blanchard on December 18, 1990); New Jersey Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8 (1989); New York Health
Care Proxy Act, N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980 to 2994 (McKinney 1990) (S.B. 6176-A signed July 22,
1990); Ohio Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Otuo REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 1337.11 to.17 (Anderson
1989); PennsylvaniaDurable Power of Attorney Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5604 to 5607 (Purdon 1988);
Rhode Island Health Care Power of Attorney, R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-1 to -2 (1989); South Dakota Durable
Power of Attorney Act, S.D. Conun LAws ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1 to -2.8 (1990); Texas Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care Act, Tex. REv. Crv. STAT. tit. 71, ch. 20, art. 4590h-1 (Vernon 1989) (Texas repealed
the Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. Rev. Crv. STAT. tit.71, ch. 20. art. 459011 by Acts 1989,71 st Leg., ch. 678,
§ 13(1), eff. Sept. 1, 1989).
" A proposed living will statute, Bill L. 839, was introduced in the Nebraska legislature in 1990. The vote
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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The federal government now has attempted to insure a patient's right to die.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 was passed on November 6,
1990.22 Title IV (Medicare, Medicaid, and Other Health-Related Programs)
contains section 4206 which solidifies a patient's right to make health care
decisions. 23 This section has been called the Federal Patient's Self-Determination
Act. It amends 42 U.S.C. sections 1395cc(a)(1) and 1866(a)(1) by directing that all
hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, hospice programs,
prepaid health organizations, and providers of service must:
(A) provide written information to each such individual concerning-(i) an individual's right under State law (whether statutory or as
recognized by the courts of the State) to make decisions concerning such
medical care, including the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical
treatment and the right to formulate advance directives ....
(3) In this subsection, the term "advance directive"means a written instruction,
such as a living will or durable power of attorney for health care, recognized
under State law (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts of the State)
and relating to the provision of such care when the individual is incapacitated.
In view of this new legislation, it appears that most patients (with the possible
exception of those in Nebraska, which does not have a statute in place) will be
informed of their rights to make advance medical care decisions. Although this is
an excellent first step, it will not eradicate the problem of patients being treated
differently in each state.
PART II: STATE STATUES
24
Although no two statutes are identical, all statutes address similar aspects.
Every state requires the document to be executed with some formality. 21 All statutes
require the declarant 26 to sign the document (or to authorize someone to sign in his
stead). 27 At least two witnesses are required in every state; however, each state

-H.R.
23Id.

5835, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1990) (effective December 1, 1991).

I For an in-depth analysis of individual state statutes, see Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The FirstDecade,

1987 Wis. L. RL.. 737-822 (Sept-Oct 1987).
17.
m"Declarant" has been defined as "a mentally competent adult who executes a declaration" or a person "who
has executed a living will". See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-18-103(4) (1990) and GA. CODE ANN. § 3132.2(3) (1990).
note 17.
2"See supra
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991
25 See supra note
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imposes different qualifications for these witnesses. 28 Some jurisdictions do not
restrict the "identity" of qualified witnesses.29 While some jurisdictions only restrict
age," others use blood or marital relationship, financial relationship or doctor/
patient relationship as the criteria.3 ' Several states also require the signatures to be
32
notarized.
Every state grants immunity to doctors, nurses, or facilities which honor the

declarant's written request.3 3 Every state also requires the declarant to notify the
health care providers of his decision.' Further, every state allows the declarant to
revoke the document. 35 Finally, every state indicates that observation of the patient's
36
directives will not be considered suicide or euthanasia.
The states treat several aspects differently. These differences form the basis
of the problem propounded in this comment; that is, based upon the differences
among statutes, patients are treated dissimilarly. Perhaps the new federal legislation
will be the first step in passing a uniform living will statute. The major differences
among the state statutes are discussed below.

2

ld.

29

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202(a) (1990); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 575 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505
(1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.3 (West 1989); MS REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18a § 5-702(A) (1990); MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 50-9-103 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983 (1990).
30
IL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 703 (1990) (witnesses must be over 18 years of age); Mo. ANN. STAT.. §
459.015(1) (Vernon 1989) (witnesses must be over 18 years of age).
3
"ALA. CODE § 22-8A4(a) (1990); AiASKASTAT. § 18.12.010(a) (1990); ARmZ. 11Ev. STAT. ANN.. § 36-3202(A)
(1) to (4) (1989); CAL. HEAn.m & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (Deering 1990); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-18-104(3)
(1990); Di.. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2503 (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422(a) (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.04(1) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(a)(1) to (5) (1990); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-3 (1990); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11 (b)(c) (Burns 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a) (1988); Ky. R1v. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.626(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.9(1989); MD. HLTHim-G . CoD
ANN. § 5-602(a) (1989); MNN. STAT. § 145B.04 (1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-111 (1990); Nav. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.600 (Michie 1989); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 137-11:3 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3(B)
(1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(C) (1990); N.D. C0NT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (Supp. 1989); Oxa.A. STAT. tit.
63, § 3103 (1989); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.610 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-70-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990);
TEN. CoDEANN. § 32-11-104(a) (1990); UTAHCODE ANN. § 75-2-1104 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,§ 5254
(1989); WAsHREv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (1990); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3 (1990); WIS. STAT. § 154.03
(1988); Wyo STAT. § 35-22-102(a) (1990).
'2HAw. 1Ev. STAT. § 327D-3 (1990); Mm. STAT. § 145B.04 (1990); N.1. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:3 (1989);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (C) (1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3103 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-70-40 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 32-11-104(a) (1990); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3 (1990).
3

See supra note 17.

Hid.
35
36

Id.
1d.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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Pregnancy Clauses

Only twelve states 37 did not incorporate a pregnancy clause into their statutes.
A majority of them nullify a declaration's effect if the declarant is pregnant.3 Other
statutes nullify the declaration's effect if the fetus could develop to the point of live

birth with the assistance of life-prolonging procedures. 3 9 Kentucky requires
terminally ill adult women who have executed a declaration to undergo a pregnancy
test. 40 New Hampshire nullifies the declaration's effect when the physician knows
of the pregnancy. 4' However, New Hampshire does not require a pregnancy test be

performed.

42

This clause, in particular, raises a very important constitutional issue. Since

a woman has a right to have an abortion during the first trimester,43 can a state protect
that fetus when the mother has declared that she not be kept alive by artificial means?
Does a terminally ill, yet competent, woman have the right to obtain an abortion so
that her living will can be honored? Courts must answer these questions as they
decide future cases.
Penaltyfor Physician'sFailure to Follow Patient'sDirective

Most states do not penalize a physician or health care facility for disregarding
a patient's directive to withhold or withdraw medical treatment. 44 Several states
"' States having no pregnancy clause include: California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
3'States nullifying a declaration if the declarant is pregnant includes: ALA. CODE § 28-8A-4(a) (1990); CONN.
GENi. STAT. § 19a-574 (Supp. 1989); DE. CODEANN. tit. 16 § 2503(d) (1990); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08(1989);
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 (1990); HAW. REv. STAT.§ 327D-6 (1990); IDAHOCoDE § 39-4504 (1990); IND. CoDE
STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a) (1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
ANN. § 16-8-11-11(d) (Burns 1990); K
§ 5-605 (1989); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 41-41-107 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 459.025 (Vernon 1989); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.610 (Michie 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3103 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (1990); WAsH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(c) (1990);
Wis. STAT. § 154.03 (1988); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-102(b) (1990).
39

ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(C) (1990); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(D) (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 2017-206(c) (1990); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6(2) (West 1989);
MINN.STAT.§ 145B. 13(3) (1990); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4.07(4)

(Supp. 1989).
"Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.624(7)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
1'
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-11:14 (1989)
42
1d.
43

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-164 (1973). Jane Doe sued for injunctive relief, challenging the
constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion statute. Id. at 113. The United States Supreme Court held
that the Texas statute was unconstitutional. It established the following guidelines for states to follow in
abortion cases: (1) the state cannot interfere during the first trimester, (2) the state may regulate to protect
maternal health during the second trimester, and (3) the state may prohibit the abortion during the third
trimester. Id. at 164.
" States which do not penalize physicians or health care facilities include: Alabama, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,

Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
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provide that the physician is guilty of only unprofessional conduct. 45 Two states
subject the physician to disciplinary sanctions." Three states may subject the
physician to criminal penalties. 47 Alaska's penalty is unique.4 The Alaska statute
directs that the attending physician who disregards the patient's directive has no
right to compensation for unwanted medical services and that the
doctor may be
49
liable to the patient or his heirs for up to a $1,000 civil penalty.

If the doctor or health care provider is not punished for ignoring the patient's
directive, then there will be no incentive to follow the patient's wishes. Although
each state requires the doctor to transfer the patient to another facility if he will not
allow a patient to die, the doctor may transfer the patient only under the threat of a
penalty. If the statute imposes sanctions against recalcitrant doctors, the legislature
will be sending a strong message to doctors thatpatients are entitled to make these
decisions.
Withholding or Withdrawing Hydration and Nutrition
Most states do not address specifically whether hydration and nutrition can be
withheld or withdrawn from a patient who has executed a living will. 0 Several
statutes direct that nutrition and hydration are not "life prolonging procedures," but,
rather, are necessary for comfort care.5 ' Three states permit nutrition and hydration
52
to be withdrawn or withheld if the patient will not die of starvation or dehydration.

43

CoLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-113(5) (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(b) (1990); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327D17(a) (1990); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 708(c) (1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107(a) (1988); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 459.045(1) (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 75-2-1112(3) (1990).
"INDm.CODE ANNr.§ 16-8-11-22 (Burns 1990); TEN. CoDE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (1990).
47
Auz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 20-17-209(a)(b) (1989) (Class A misdemeanor); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18a § 5710(A) (1990) (Class Ecrime); MoNr. CODE ANN.§ 50-9-206(1)(2) (1989) (Misdemeanor punishable by fine
up to $500, or one year in county jail, or both).
"AL.sKA STAT. § 18.12.070(a) (1990).
4
9

1d.

"States which make no specification include: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
51
States which consider nutrition and hydration comfort care include: Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(c)
(1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-206(b); GA. CODE ANNo. § 31-32-2(5)(A) (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-811-4 (Burns 1990); Ma. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(1) (1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (Vernon
1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2 (1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3102(4) (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4477-20(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1103(6)(b) (1990); Wis. STAT. § 154.01 (5)(6)
(1988); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-101 (1990).
'2 States which permit nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn or withheld if the patient will not die of
starvation or dehydration include: IDAHOCODE § 39-4504 (1990); ILL.REv. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 702(d) (1988);
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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In Alaska, 3 Maine, s ' and Minnesota 5 the patient can direct that nutrition and
hydration be withheld or withdrawn. Two states allow nutrition and hydration to be
withdrawn or withheld if it is not necessary to relieve pain or provide comfort care,
or if it could not be physically assimilated.5 6 Colorado allows allow nutrition and
57
hydration to be withdrawn or withheld if it is the patient's only treatment.
However, the physician can override this directive if, in his opinion, the nutrition and
hydration are necessary to relieve pain. 5
Again, this is an important restriction of the patient's right to die. The conflict
among statutes means that a patient in a PVS in one state can be allowed to die,
whereas a similarly-situated patient in another state can be forced to endure artificial
nutrition and hydration for years. Even if both patients had executed identical living
will documents, one state would honor her wishes, while the otherstate would ignore
them. All states should protect a fundamental right Citizens should not be required
to examine the differences among state statutes as they choose in which state to
reside. Their wishes should be honored in every jurisdiction throughout the United
States. A uniform living will statute would alleviate this problem.
COURT DEctsIONs
In addition to the various statutes, courts have decided many cases based upon
the common law and constitution. 9 This section will briefly overview these major
cases.
Right to Privacy/Rightto Die
In Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,60 the United States Supreme Court
recognized an individual's right to privacy when it held: "[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others ....
-61 The Supreme Court also recognized the rightto privacy

-1ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c) (1990).
-ME.REv.STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701(4)(A) (1990).
-"Mw.STAT. § 145D.03(b)(1) (1990).
56
MoNr. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(2) (1989); N.D. CEr. CODE § 23-06.4.07(3) (Supp. 1989).
5'CoLo REV. STAT.§ 15-18-104(2.5) (1990).
s COLO.REv.STAT.§ 15-18-104(2.6) (1990).
9

For an in-depth discussion of the various court decisions and the tests used by the courts (best interests,
self-determination, substituted judgment, and informed consent), see, e.g., Rhoden, Litigating Life and
Death, 102 HARv. L. REV.375 (1988-89); Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservationof Life: From
Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 Oro ST. L. J. 891 (1989); Weinberg, Whose Right Is It Anyway? Individualism,
Community, andtheRight to Die: A Commentary on theNew Jersey Experience, 40 HASTINGS LJ.119 (1988-

89).6OUnion Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
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in Olmstead v. UnitedStates. 2 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis stated,
"[tihe makers of our constitution... conferred as against the Government, the right
to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man.

63

This right was further expanded in Griswold v. Connecticut" where Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, found that there is a constitutional right to privacy
that can be found in the penumbra of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.6"
In Roe v. Wade,"6 the Court found that the "right of privacy ...is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whetherornot to terminate pregnancy.1 67 However,
the Court acknowledged that privacy rights are not absolute. Therefore, privacy
rights may yield to a state's "compelling" interests. 68 The Roe Court held that the
state cannot interfere during the first trimester, that the state may regulate to protect
maternal health during the second trimester, and that the state may prohibit the
69
abortion during the third trimester.
The states have extended this fundamental right to privacy (now also
interpreted as the right to "bodily integrity") to right to die cases. In In re Conroy,0
the 84-year old patient suffered from severe organic brain syndrome and several
other ailments. 7 ' She totally depended upon a nasogastric tube for nutrition and
hydration. 72 The court held that "[tihe right to make certain decisions concerning
73
one's body is also protected by the federal constitutional right of privacy.1
74

Competent Patients

Kathleen Farrell, a 37-year old competent woman, suffered from terminal
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), commonly called Lou Gehrig's disease." In
62
Olmstead
63

v. United States, 277 U.S. 439 (1928).
1d. at 478.
'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"Jd.at 483-486. This "penumbra" theory has been frequently criticized. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Goldberg found that the right of marital privacy is protected under the Ninth Amendment since it is a liberty
not specifically enumerated in the first eight amendments. Id. at 487. Justice Harlan rejected both
approaches in his concurring opinion and held that the Connecticut statute infringed the DueProcess Clause
and violated the basic value of liberty. Id. at 500.
"
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6
71d. at 153.
"Id. at 154.
"Id.
at 163-164.
7
Inre Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
71
Id. at 326, 486 A.2d 1216.
72
Id.
73 Id. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1222.
74
See also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Bartling v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. 282, 383 A.2d 785
(1978).
75
In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 341, 529 A.2d 404, 407 (1987).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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November 1985, three years after being diagnosed with ALS and two years after
undergoing a tracheotomy and being connected to a respirator, Kathleen told her
husband she wanted to be disconnected from the machine.16 The husband petitioned
the court for permission to disconnect the machine." The trial court granted his
request. 78 Kathleen died while her guardian's appeal was pending. 79 The court
reaffirmed the "well-recognized common-law right of self-determination that
'[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body .... "',80 The court then established the following
guidelines to follow when a competent patient living at home requests the
discontinuance of life-support systems: (1) the patient must be deemed to be
competent, (2) the patient must be deemed to have voluntarily made his choice
without coercion, and (3) the patient's right to choose must be balanced against the
four countervailing state interests: preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding
the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting third persons. 81 The courtheld
generally
that "[a] competent person's interest in her or his self-determination
82
outweighs any countervailing interest the state might have.
In Lane v. Candura8 3 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts allowed a 77-year
old patient to refuse to have her leg amputated, even though the operation probably
wouldhave savedherlife. 84 The court stated that"[t]he law protects herright to make
her own decision to accept or reject treatment, whether that decision is wise or
unwise." 85 The court further determined that "[a] person is86 presumed to be
competent unless shown by the evidence not to be competent."
Abe Perlmutter, 73-years old, also suffered from Lou Gehrig's disease.8 7 The
trial court granted his request to have the respirator removed.8 8 The district court
affirmed that decision. 89 The court determined that since the patient is entitled to
initially refuse treatment, that patient is also entitled to discontinue treatment when
he so chooses. 90 The court concluded that:
It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so
that there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and
6

' 1d. at 345, 529 A.2d at 409.
77Id.

"Id. at 346, 529 A.2d at 409.
7
Id. at 347, 529 A.2d at 410.
0
1d. quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).

"Id.
at 354, 529 A.2d at 413.
2

' M. at 358, 529 A.2d at 416.
"Lane v. Candura, 6.Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).

-id. at 378, 376 N.E.2d at 1233.
8Id. at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1236.
"Id. at 382,376 N.E.2d at 1235.
' Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 1978), affd. 379 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980).
"Id. at 161-62.
'91d. at 162.
Published
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no possible trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite another
matter to do so at the patient's sole expense and against his competent
will, thus inflicting never ending physical torture on his body until the
inevitable, but artificially suspended, moment of death. Such a course
of conduct invades the basic constitutional right of privacy, removes his
freedom of choice and invades his right to self-determine. 9'
92

Incompetent Patients

The most well-known decisions are those in which the families of artificiallysustained incompetent patients have petitioned the courts to remove the lifesustaining procedures. These are the cases which made the headlines and brought
this issue before the American public.
In the seminal case of In re Quinlan,93 Karen Ann Quinlan, 22-years old,
lapsed into a PVS for reasons unclear.Y The trial court refused to permit Karen's
father to withdraw the life support system. 95 However, the New Jersey Supreme
Court immediately modified and remanded the case. It ordered the trial court to
appoint Karen's father her guardian and to grant him full power to make Karen's
health care decisions. 96 The court relied upon the doctrine of substituted judgment,
stating "[tihe only practical way to prevent destruction of the right [to privacy] is to
permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment... as to
whether she would exercise it in these circumstances." 9 The Court also noted, "[tlhe
State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately, there comes
a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State's interest."98
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also applied the substituted
judgment doctrine to determine whether medical treatment could be withheld from
a 67-year-old severely retarded patient with leukemia. 99 The court weighed the
patient's wishes against the following state interests:
(1) the preservation of life;

91Id. at 164.

'See also Barberv. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006,195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); In re Jobes, 108 N.J.
394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp. Inc., 398 Mass. 417,497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Greenspan, 137 11. 2d 1,558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990).
93 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied 429 U.S. 992 (1976).
941d. at 23, 355 A.2d at 653.
9Id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653.
"Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671.
SId. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
"Id.
"Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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(2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties;
(3) the prevention of suicide; and
(4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." 0°
The court held that "the decision in cases such as this should be that which would
be made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into
account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors
which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent
10
person." '
The only right to die case to come before the United States Supreme Court is
Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Dept. of Health."°2 Nancy Cruzan was 25 years old

when she was in an automobile accident in 1983.103 Nancy lacked oxygen for
approximately 13 minutes. She subsequently lapsed into acoma, then into a PVS. '4
The trial court allowed her parents to discontinue nutrition and hydration. 05
However, the Missouri Supreme Court disagreed." °6 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court decision. °7 It also held that due process
would notrequire a state to accept the substituted judgmentof close family members,
absent clear and convincing proof of the incompetent patient's wishes."'0 The Court
conceded that "the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse life saving hydration and nutrition.""' 9
Following the United States Supreme Court decision, Nancy's parents
requested a new evidentiary hearing before the original trial court and introduced
new witnesses. 0 A new hearing was held inNovember 1990.111 On December 14,
1990, Judge Charles E. Teel, Jr., of the Jasper County, Missouri Probate Court ruled
that the parents could stop the artificial feedings." 2 Nancy died at the Missouri
13
Rehabilitation Center on December 26, 1990.

"'-d. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
'01 1d. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
'°'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).

'3
Id. at 2844.
"'Id.at 2845.

'0'5 d. at 2846.
10I6d.
107 id. at 2855.
103Id. at 2854.

1091d. at 2852.
" 0 LA. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, Part A at 17, col. 1.
'N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1990, § 1 at 10, col. 1.
"'N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1990, § 1 at 10, col. 1.
1'3LA. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, Part A at 17, col. 1.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 8
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:3 & 4

The dicta in Cruzanhas been widely interpreted to mean that apatient's wishes
will be followed if a living will is executed or, in the alternative, that a duly appointed
surrogate can make these decisions on behalf of the patient." 4 Unfortunately, the
majority holding only concerns the standard of proof a state can require and whether
the state has to adopt the substituted judgment of the patient's family. The Court did
not determine that a patient who has not executed a prior directive automatically has
a constitutional right to die.
Since the Cruzan Court failed to face the right to die issue head-on, the courts
of the various jurisdictions will continue to establish their own criteria. A uniform
living will statute would promote uniformity and certainty and would preserve to all
patients the fundamental right to decide.
PART III: Omio's TR.EATmENT
Thus far, the State of Ohio has failed to pass a living will statute" 5 and to
thereby extend the fundamental right to make medical decisions to its citizens.
Ohio's lower courts have decided three major right to die cases. "6 However, to date,
the Ohio Supreme Court has not addressed the issue.
Court Decisions
Ohio's first right to die case was Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center,(Leach
I)."' The Court of Common Pleas of Summit County considered whether a 70 yearEdna Leach was
old ALS patient's life support system could be terminated.'
9
diagnosed with ALS on June 11, 1980." She entered the hospital on July 27,
1980.12° On July 29, 1980 Edna suffered cardiac arrest, was resuscitated, was and
placed on life support systems.' 2' Edna's husband requested that the support system
be terminated. 2 2 On October 13, 1980, her doctor attested that her condition was
"hopeless" and that "her ultimate demise [was] only a matter of time.' 2 3 However,
24
the doctor insisted that the life support could only be terminated by court order.
A legal guardian was appointed, and a hearing was held. 25 Seventeen witnesses
recalled conversations that they had with Edna prior to her illness. 26 Three doctors
""The National Law Journal, Nov. 19, 1990, at 22, col. 4.
'"See Introduction, supra.
""See Court Decisions, infra.
""Leachv. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
"'Id. at 2,426 N.E.2d at 810.
11
91d.
1201ld.
121id.

id. at 3,426 N.E.2d at 810.
1Id.at 3,426 N.E.2d at 811.
124d.
1251Id.

1261d.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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127
testified that Edna's condition was terminal and that there was no known cure.

The Court of Common Pleas relied upon decisions from other jurisdictions,
such as In re Quinlan121 and Matter of Eichner,29 to extend the constitutionally
guaranteed right of privacy to right to die cases. 30 The court next performed a
balancing test similar to that followed in Roe v. Wade. 1 ' Under this test, the court
balanced the patient's constitutionally protected right against the state's interests:
preservation of life, protection of third parties, maintenance of the ethical integrity
of the medical profession, and prevention of suicide.'32 The court concluded that
Edna's constitutional right outweighed the state's interests. 33 The court further held
that clear and convincing proof was required.'13 The court allowed the respirator to
be disconnected only if certain conditions were met:
(1) two doctors must examine Edna and certify that she continued to be in a
permanent vegetative state;
(2) the Summit County Coroner and Prosecutor must receive 48 hours'
notice of the examination and could have a witness present;
(3) after the examination, there was to be a 48 hour waiting period before the
and the Coroner and Prosecutor could have a
act of discontinuance
35
present.
witness
The second Ohio case was Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, (Leach 11).136 Edna's
respirator was disconnected on January 6, 1981, and she died. 37 In July, 1982,
Edna's heirs filed an action for damages for the time that Edna was forced to endure
the life support system. 38 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. 3 9 The court of appeals reversed
and remanded the case for the following reasons:
(1) Plaintiffs did state a cause of action in their complaint, and the
motion for summary judgment was improperly granted.
127 d. at 4, 426 N.E.2d at 811.

"In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied 429 U.S. 992 (1976).
""Matter of Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S. 2d 517 (1980), modified In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 266 (1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
"0Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 7, 426 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1980).
31
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,9, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1980).
"'Leach
3
1 1d. at 10, 426 N.E.2d at 815.
1-Jd. at 11,426 N.E.2d at 815.
135 Id. at 12-13, 426 N.E.2d at 816.

"Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393,469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
13'Id. at 394,469 N.E.2d 1051.
1I Id.
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(2) A physician who treats a patient without consent commits a battery
and the patient may recover for battery if his refusal is ignored.
(3) There is a requirement ofinformed consentby which the doctorhas
a duty to obtain the patient's informed consent to any medical
treatment.
(4) Where the patient is not competent to consent, an authorized person
may consent in the patient's behalf.
(5) Until such time as the legislature provides more efficient means of
protecting the rights of patients, there must be judicial approval
before a life support system can be withdrawn, and Plaintiff may
not recover for ordinary medical expenses incurred during the time
reasonably required to obtain court permission.
(6) The doctors should have received consent from someone acting on
the patient's behalf before placing her on the life support system
unless it was an emergency.
(7) There were genuine issues of fact, and the complaint should not
have been dismissed.140
The Ohio Court of Appeals has decided only one case since Ohio's Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care Act was enacted.141 David Couture was 29 years
old when he lapsed into PVS in reaction to medication he had taken. 142 Daniel's
mother was originally appointed his guardian. 4 1 She asked Daniel's caretakers to
withdraw his artificial nutrition and hydration. 1 " Daniel's father opposed the
request.141 However, after a hearing on June 26, 1989, the probate court allowed the
guardian to make any future treatment decisions.' 46 Daniel's father appealed the
decision. 47 The probate court granted a temporary restraining order from which the
hospital appealed.' 48 Finally, on August 2, 1989, Daniel's mother voluntarily
withdrew as guardian. 49 His father was appointed in her stead. 5 ' Daniel's life

I'°Jd.
at 394-95, 469 N.E.2d 1051-1054 (1984).
Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208, 549 N.E.2d 571 (1989).
1 Id. at 209, 549 N.E.2d at 572.
143 Id.
'4'

42

144Id.
45

1

Id.

'46Id. at 209, 549 N.E.2d at 572.
147 Id.
48Id. at 210, 549 N.E.2d at 573.
149Id.
'soId.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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expectancy was only one to two months at the time of the June 26 hearing.' 5'
The court held that nutrition and hydration could not be withdrawn from a
patient.152 It based its decision solely upon the Durable Powerof Attorney for Health
Care Act, more specifically Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 1337.13.153 The court's
decision was quite surprising since the case was decided two months prior to the
effective date of the statute, and Daniel had not executed a Durable Power of

Attorney for Health Care. Based upon section 1337.13(E), the court held that: (1)
Daniel's death was not imminent; (2) withdrawal of the nutrition and hydration
would result in death by malnutrition or dehydration; and (3) the public policy of
Ohio, as determined by the General Assembly, opposed this type of action,
regardless of the patient's or his surrogate's wishes."l
Based upon this decision, at least in the Second Appellate District, patients
will not enjoy their fundamental right to make health care decisions. Consequently,
they will not be permitted to die with dignity.
Interestingly, State Senator Richard Pfeiffer, Jr., chief sponsor of the Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care Act observed, "the [Couture]court is wrong ....

It was not our
Clearly the court did not interpret the intent of the law correctly ....
5
intent to stop that practice."'
1
1d.
1521d. at 212, 549 N.E.2d at 574.

" 3 tOmo REv. CODE AN.

§ 1337.13(E) (Anderson 1989) provides:

(E) An attorney in fact undera durable power of attorney for health care does not have
authority to refuse or withdraw informed consent to the provision of nutrition or hydration
to the principal, unless, prior to the refusal or withdrawal of that informed consent, all of the
following apply:
(1) In the opinion of the principal's attending physician and at least one otherphysician,
the provision of nutrition or hydration to the principal would not provide comfort to the
principal;
(2) In the opinion of the principal's attending physician and at least one otherphysician,
either of the following situations exists:
(a) The death of the principal is imminent whether or not nutrition or hydration is
provided to the principal, the non provision of nutrition or hydration to the principal is not
likely to result in the death of the principalby malnutritionor dehydration;
(b) If nutrition or hydration were provided to the principal, the nutrition or hydration
either could not be assimilated or would shorten the life of the principal;
(3) The principal's attending physician and the other physicians involved enter their
opinions as described in divisions (E)(1) and (2) of this section in the health care records
of the principal.
(Emphasis added) (effective September 27, 1989)
" Couture v. Couture, 48 Ohio App. 3d 208, 213,549 N.E.2d 571, 575.
August 1990, Association for Freedom to Die, quoting Columbus Daily Reporter,
" 5 AFRED
Published
by Newsletter,
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991
Feb. 2, 1990, at 4.
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Ohio Durable Power ofAttorneyfor Health Care Act
Ohio's Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act became effective on
September 27, 1989.156 This statute was passed while the Ohio General Assembly
attempted to pass a living will statute. Although this statute is a first step in
protecting the patient's right to die, it is not the final answer. In fact, this statute could
create more problems than it solves.
The main difference between the living will and a durable power of attorney
for health care is that through a living will, the patient articulates his own directives;
conversely, through a durable power of attorney for health care, the patient merely
appoints an agent to make medical decisions for him. Because the agent may not
follow the principal's wishes, the principal may still be denied his fundamental right
to decide. A living will statute and durable power of attorney for health care statute
that work together to protect the patient under all circumstances would be the ideal
solution. Alternatively, a combined act that contains a living will section and a
section for appointment of proxy or surrogate would be helpful. 57
The Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act was narrowly drafted and
is very restrictive. Some of the major areas of concern are as follows:
Section 1337.11 (I) defines "terminal condition" as "any illness or
injury that is likely to result in imminent death, regardless of the type,
nature, and amount of health care that is provided."'' 8 The term
"imminent" is not defined. Moreover, the Act apparently excludes
anyone who is in a PVS.
Section 1337.11 (E) defines "hydration"' 5 9and section 1337.11 (G)
defines "nutrition."'' 6 However, the definitions do not indicate whether
they are considered to be part of "comfort care" (which also is not
defined). If they are, then they cannot be withheld from the patient.
Section 1337.12 articulates execution requirements. Inter alia,
section 1337.12 requires the declarant to sign and date the instrument

56

OHo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11 to.17 (Anderson 1989).
'57See supra note 18.
ISS1Omo RaV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11(I) (Anderson 1989).

'"Osuo REv. CODE ANN.§ 1337.11(E) (Anderson 1989). "Hydration" means fluids administered in any
manner.
160OmoRav. CODE ANN. § 1337.11 (G) (Anderson, 1989). "Nutrition" means sustenance administered orally
or by way of the gastrointestinal tract.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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before two witnesses (with similar restrictions as discussed in Part I),161
or before a notary public. This section also provides that the document
expires after seven years. This time limitation can cause serious
problems. Most people do not carefully order and manage their
documents. Once a person executes an important document, he files it
away, knowing that he has taken care of the business. To expect people
to renew their declaration every seven years burdens them, especially
older individuals who have faced the issue, made their decision, and
executed the appropriate document. Regular powers of attorney and last
wills and testaments do not lapse after a certain time frame. Any logical
reasons raised for imposing these restrictions (such as fraud, duress,
forgetfulness) would equally apply to other powers of attorney and
wills. Therefore, there is no apparent reason to restrict the duration of
the durable power of attorney for health care.

Spring, 19911

717

Section 1337.13 delineates the agent's authority. Subsection (B)
provides that the document is effective if the principal is in a terminal
condition. Subsection (D) provides that if the principal is pregnant, care
cannot be withdrawn or withheld unless the pregnancy or health care
would pose a substantial risk to the life of the principal or unless two
doctors certify that the fetus would not be born alive. Subsection (E)
restricts the withholding of nutrition and hydration unless death is
imminent and the cause of death will not be malnutrition ordehydration.
The Couture 62 Court relied upon this subsection. Again, this subsection
greatly restricts a PVS patient's and a pregnant woman's fundamental
right to reject health care.
The statute also discusses requirements for revocation, 63 immunity
for physicians and other persons,'"and transfer of patient to a willing
65
facility.
Section 1337.17's last provision requires the use of a special
printed form which must contain a lengthy, detailed, legalistic notice to
the principal.1 66 From the language of the statute, it appears that this
notice must be printed on the form. This section also does not reveal
whether a form executed by an individual in another state would be
honored in Ohio.
See supra notes 25 to 32.
62

See supranote 153 and accompanying text.
t'Orno REv. CoDE ANN. § 1337.14 (Anderson 1989).
'

I" Owo REv. CODE ANN.

§ 1337.15 (Anderson 1989).
Omo Ray. CoDE ANN. § 1337.16 (Anderson 1989).
1989).
I"Oto REv.
CODE ANN. § 1337.17 (Anderson
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991
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The inability to deal with the issue of PVS patients, the restrictive time limit,
the special form requirement, and the failure to consider patients who have not
executed a durable power of attorney for health care all combine to make this statute
very restrictive. If the Ohio courts will rely only upon this statute to make their
decisions, potentially all PVS patients will end up like Daniel Couture.

PART IV: PROPOSED LIVING WILL

STATUrE

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
drafted a proposed Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act (1989).167 The
American Bar Association has approved the statute for adoption by all the states.'"
No states have adopted the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Il Act in its entirety.
Rather, they have used it as a guideline for creating their own statutes. This is
unfortunate. Realistically, probably no act could address every single issue in
connection with a patient's right to make medical decisions. However, if the states
had been willing to adopt the Uniform Act, at least all patients would be similarly
treated.
Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act (1989)
The best feature of this proposed legislation is its simplicity. Each section
includes extensive explanatory comments. States should adopt not only the
sections, but also the comments, to make their statutes as clear as possible.
Under the definitions, "terminal condition" is defined as "an incurable and
irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment
will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in death within a relativelyshort
time." (emphasis added) 16 9 This language has eliminated the problem of defining the
term "imminent" which appears in most of the state statutes.
The Uniform Act does not require a specific form, but instead, offers a oneparagraph sample. 7 ° Two individuals must witness the declaration. However, the
Uniform Act does not restrict the "identity" of qualified witnesses. 171 This relieves
the patient from the chore of finding witnesses who qualify under some complicated
set of rules. The Uniform Act also provides for appointment of a surrogate to make
medical decisions for the patient. 72 Again, the form is optional, and the witnesses
are not restricted.

73

67
See Appendix A, UNioimRiGrs oF
'6 See Id.

TERMINALLY ILL Acr (1989).

'"Uniform Rights of the Terminally Il Act, § 1(9) (1989).
170Uniform Rights of the Terminally M1Act § 2(b) (1989).
171Id.
1721d.

7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
. UmnzoRM Ricnrs op "m TERmNALLY ILL Acr § 2(c) (1989).

20

Shields-Stiefel: A Time To Live
A TtME To LIVE

Spring, 19911

The Uniform Act also considers a patient who has not executed a declaration
concerning health care. 7 4 The Act provides the following hierarchy of persons who
are entitled to make the decision for the patient:
(1) the spouse of the individual;
(2) an adult child of the individual or, if there is more than one adult child,
a majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for
consultation;
(3) the parents of the individual;
(4) an adult sibling of the individual or, if there is more than one adult sibling,
a majority of the adult siblings who are reasonably available for
consultation; or
(5) the nearest other adult relative of the individual by blood or adoption who
- is reasonably available for consultation.""

The Uniform Act also imposes penalties upon doctors and other individuals
who fail to follow the patient's directives. 76 Unfortunately, the penalties have been
left blank for each state to establish. This failure to establish penalties could protect
doctors from punishment for failing to follow the patient's wishes. Again, penalties
should be imposed, even if only sanctions or charges of unprofessional conduct, to
assure that the doctors will honor the directives.
Unfortunately, the Uniform Act implies that nutrition and hydration may be
necessary for comfort care. 77 Moreover, the Act prohibits withdrawal from a
pregnant patient if the fetus could develop to the point of live birth. 17 The comment
to this section suggests that the withdrawal or withholding of nutrition and hydration
should be decided on a case-by-case basis, but also suggests that the declarant can
issue specific directions in the declaration. 9 The declaration should include a
section wherein the patient can check whether he wants this type of treatment
withheld or withdrawn. The previous version of the Act provided, "[u]nless the
declaration provides otherwise," life-sustaining treatment could not be withheld
from a pregnant woman. 80 The comment suggests that states may follow the earlier
version, thus giving pregnant women the same rights as other patients in their health
care decisions.'

74

Ui roRM RGMs oF THE TERmIALLY IU ACr §
'75 UNWORM RIGHTS OF ThiE TERMINALLY ILL ACr §
76
1
U
Riop~
OFm TEiwnALLY ILL Acr §
'

'"UNoiLRM RIGHTS op TilE TERMINALLY
"n UNMORM RIGHTIOF THE TERMINALLY
'UNIFORM RIGTS op THE TERMINALLY

7(a) (1989).
7(b) (1989).

10 (1989).

IL Acr § 6(b) (1989).
ILL Acr § 6(c) (1989).
ILL Acr § 6(c) (Comment) (1989).

1811d.
Published
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Even with these few drawbacks, the Uniform Act is far superior to many of
the state statutes which are presently in force. It is unfortunate that the states have
failed to recognize and adopt the Uniform Act, thus ensuring equal treatment to
patients in every state.
Senate Bill 1
The proposed statute that passed the Ohio Senate on February 5, 1991,
combines a living will statute with Ohio's DPA/HC statute. The act contains many
of the Uniform Act's best features.
The proposed act defines "terminal condition" as "a condition caused by
disease, illness, or injury from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as
determined by a principal's attending physician and one other physician who has
examined the principal, both of the following apply:
(1) there can be no recovery,
(2) there is a permanently unconscious state, or death is likely to occur
within a relatively short time if life-sustaining treatment is not
administered. "8 2
By adopting the "relatively short time" standard, Ohio will not need to judicially
define the term "imminent."
By amending Ohio Rev. Code section 1337.12(A)(3), the legislature has
removed the seven-year time limit.'5 ' The proposed amendments to section
1337.12(B) simplify the execution requirements by allowing any adult who is not
related to the principal, who is not the attorney-in-fact named in the instrument, and
who is not the attending physician to serve as a witness. 184 Section 1337.13(E)
forbids the attorney-in-fact to withdraw nutrition or hydration unless the principal
is in a terminal condition and has authorized the attorney-in-fact to withdraw such
support.' 85 This authorization must appear in the declaration in capital letters and
must be initialed by the principal. 8 6
"82Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen Ass. (1991) § 1337.11(R).
't Sub. S.B. 1,119th Gen. Ass. (1991). "A durable power of attorney for health care shall not expire unless
the principal specifies an expiration date in the instrument.
'" Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991). Any person who is related to the principal by blood, marriage, or
adoption, any person whois designated asthe attorney-in-fact in the instrument, and any attending physician
are
ineligible to be witnesses.
5
'" Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991).
Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991). "Including a statement in capital letters that the attorney in fact may
refuse or withdraw informed consent to the provision of nutrition or hydration to the principal if he is in a
terminal condition, or checking or otherwise marking abox or line that is adjacent to a similar statement on
a printed form of a durable power of attorney for health care."
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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Unfortunately, the legislature's proposed amendments to Ohio Rev. Code
section 1337.13(D) provide that health care cannot be withheld or withdrawn from
a pregnant patient unless such care would pose a substantial risk to the principal's
life, or the fetus would not be born alive. 8 The legislature has also failed to
enumerate penalties for doctors who ignore the patient's directives. It has also
retained the complicated instructions to the patient. 8
S.B. 1 provides for the enactment of new section 2133.01, which will become
the Modified Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. 8 9 Section 2133.02(A)(1) allows the
patient to request that nutrition or hydration be withheld or withdrawn if the patient
checks the appropriate box.' 90 Thus, the legislature is allowing the patient, not the
doctor,to make this choice. Section 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(ii) provides the following
hierarchy of persons who can decide for the patient if he has not executed either a
living will or a durable power of attorney for health care:
a) declarant's guardian, if any;
b) declarant's spouse;
c) an adult child of the declarant or, if there is more than one adult child, a
majority of the declarant's adult children who are available within a
reasonable period of time for consultation with the declarant's attending
physician;
d) the declarant's parents;
e) an adult sibling of the declarant or, if there is more than one adult sibling,
a majority of the declarant's adult siblings who are available within a
reasonable period of time for consultation with the declarant's attending
physician; or
f) the nearest adult who is not described in the previously described priority
classes of individuals, who is related to the declarant by blood or
adoption, and who is available within a reasonable period of time for
consultation with the declarant's attending physician.
Section 2133.06(C) includes the same restrictions for pregnant women as the
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care AcL Sub. S.B. 1 imposes no penalties
upon physicians who fail to follow directives.' 9' However, even with these
limitations, the proposed legislation's strengths far outweigh its weaknesses.
...
Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen Ass. (1991). "If the decision pertains to a principal who is pregnant and if the
withholding or withdrawal of health care would terminate the pregnancy, the attending physician makes,
in good faith and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, a determination whether or not the pregnancy
or health care involved would pose a substantial risk to the life of the principal, or a determination whether

or not the fetus would be born alive."
'u Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991). The instructions fill approximately 140 lines or 5 pages of the
proposed Act.
'"Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991).
'"Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991).
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991
'9'Sub. S.B.
1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991).
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Finally, the last section of Sub. S.B. 1 notes that S.B. 13 (Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care Act) was not intended to affect the ability of competent
adults or guardians to make "informed health care decisions for themselves or their
wards." 92 This statement corrects the Couture court's erroneous interpretation of
193
that statute and insures that courts will not repeat the Couturemistake.

CONCLUSION
The legal profession must keep pace with medical technology in order to
protect the rights of individuals. There are as many as 10,000 patients across the
country lying in persistent vegetative states being kept "alive" by artificial means. 94
The oldest of these patients is purported to be Rita Green, who has been unconscious
since 1951.195 The right to die has become the abortion issue of the 1990's. There

are dedicated, active, and sometimes militant groups on both sides of the issue.
Many polls indicate that Americans believe that they should be allowed to
make their own health care decisions.196 Only comprehensive legislation can
guarantee an individual's right to control his health care.
As can be seen from this Comment, the states have boldly attempted to
implement legislation that will allow persons to make their own health care
decisions. However, many of these statutes are very narrow and create serious
problems. This patchwork method should not continue. The American Bar
Association and the American Medical Association should jointly attempt to
persuade all states to adopt the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. It is the
best solution to the present problem. Even though the Act permits minordiscrepancies
among the states, they are not so broad and sweeping as to deny most patients the
right to die with dignity.

"ISub. S.B.

1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991).
193
Sub. S.B. 1 has been referred to the Ohio House of Representatives, and the first meeting of the Civil and
Commercial Law Committee was scheduled for February 12, 1991, at 1:30 p.m. At that time Senator
Montgomery was scheduled to give Sponsor Testimony concerning Sub. S.B. 1. At the same time
Representative Guthrie was scheduled to give Sponsor Testimony concerning H.B. 70. The Committee will
also discuss the case law in this area at the same meeting. The testimony on these bills has been adjourned
twice; and, as of March 28, 1991, the bill is still in Committee. Perhaps the Legislature will finally pass a
comprehensive version of a living will bill, such as Sub. S.B. I appears to be.
9
' Chicago Tribune, Jan. 7, 1991, Zone C at 13.
195Id.

16 Poll by American Medical Association in 1986 indicated 73% ofrespondents approved "withdrawing lifesupport systems, including food and water, from hopelessly ill or irreversibly comatose patients if they or
their families request it." A 1985 Gallup poll indicated that 81% of respondents would like to see a ruling
in their state which finds that all life-sustaining medical treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from
terminally ill patients, provided that is what the patients want orwould want if they were able to express their
wishes. ABC's news program "Nightline," conducted a poll in 1986, and 70% of the respondents strongly
agreed that the immediate family, not the courts, should decide whether to refuse life-support measures for
incompetent patients, and the same 70% favored advance directives. (Society for the Right to Die Legislative
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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When the Federal Patient Self-Determination Act goes into effect on December
1, 1991, patients will be informed of their rights to execute living wills and durable

powers of attorney. This will affect many people. However, there are many people
who lapse into unconsciousness before they ever see the doctor or get to the hospital.

These individuals also must be provided for, and the states must enact legislation that
guarantees to everyone the right to die in a dignified manner.
POST SCRIP

Five months after Sub. S. B. 1 passed the Senate, the State of Ohio finally
joined the ranks of other states that grant patients the "right to die."' 9 Although Am.
Sub. S. B. 1 underwent fourteen amendments while in committee, the basic
framework remained unchanged. 98 This Post Script identifies the significant
changes to Am. Sub. S. B. 1.
In Am. Sub. S. B. 1, the legislature opted to distinguish between a patient who

is in a"permanently unconscious state"199 and one who is in a "terminal condition. ' '200
Even though "permanently unconscious state" is no longer synonymous with
"terminal condition," the statute applies to patients in either condition. Although
this change appears insignificant, it may have far reaching repercussions as
discussed below.
Another seemingly minor change involves who may make health care
decisions fora patient. Under section 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(ii), the legislature removed
the catch-all category of "any person related by blood or adoption" from the
hierarchy of classes of persons capable of making health care decisions for the
"'Am. Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 90 to 4 on June
20, 1991. On June 25,1991, the Senate concurrent vote was 32 to Iin favor of the amended bill. Governor
George Voinovich signed Am. Sub. S. B. 1 into law on July 11, 1991. The new law will become effective
on October 10, 1991. Telephone interview with the Legislative Information Office (July 15, 1991).
'"Telephone interview with Senator Montgomery's office (June 27, 1991).
'"Am. Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 1337.11(0) provides:
"Permanently unconscious state" means a state of permanent unconsciousness in a principal
that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in accordance with reasonable
medical standards by the principal's attending physician and one other physician who has
examined the principal, is characterized by both of the following:
(1) The principal is irreversibly unaware of himself and his environment.
(2) There is a total loss of cerebral cortical functioning, resulting in the principal having no
capacity to experience pain or suffering.
'00Am. Sub. S.B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 1337.11(Y) provides:
"Terminal condition" means an irreversible,
disease, illness, or injury from which, to
determined in accordance with reasonable
physician and one other physician who has
apply:
can be no recovery.
Published(1)byThere
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991
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patient."' By removing the remote class of any relative, a patient who is not survived
by an individual from one of the named classes may not be afforded the same rights
under this section as the patient would have had under Sen. Montgomery's version
of the bill. Even though the Probate Court can appoint a guardian to make a decision
for the patient, this procedure can be time consuming and expensive. There simply
does not seem to be any valid reason why the legislature removed this class of
persons from the hierarchy. Perhaps this class will be reinstated as the courts test
this law.
The legislature substantially changed the provision for pregnant patients
under the Living Will section. 202 Under the revised section, treatment can only be
withheld from a pregnant patient if two physicians determine that the fetus will not
be born alive. 203 This section no longer considers whether the pregnancy is
dangerous to the patient. In the Living Will section, the legislature eliminated the
balancing which takes place under the Durable Power of Attorney section. 20 Under
the Durable Power of Attorney section, the legislature has recognized that the life
of the patient is paramount.20 5 Nevertheless, the legislature has failed to afford
pregnant patients comparable dignity and rights under the Living Will section. This
distinction may form the basis for much litigation in the future as the husbands and
families of pregnant patients challenge this inequity.
The most significant change in Am. Sub. S. B. 1 appears in the addition of
the No Document section.206 This section allows the life-sustaining treatment to be
withdrawn or withheld from a patient who has not executed or has improperly
executed a declaration. 2 7 In order to invoke this section, the patient must either be
in a terminal condition or have been in a permanently unconscious state for the
preceding twelve months.2t The legislature set forth a hierarchy of persons who can
consent to withholding or withdrawing treatment:
1) patient's guardian, if any;

20

(2) Death is likely to occur within a relatively short time if life-sustaining treatment is not
administered.
Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(i),(ii) provides that the hierarchy is as

follows:
a)
b)
c)
d)

the person declarant designated in the declaration;
declarant's guardian, if any;
declarant's spouse;
declarant's adult children;

e) declarant's parents;
f) declarant's adult siblings, or a majority thereof.
"°Am.Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.06(B). [Living Will section of the legislation.]
203
Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.06(B).
254

Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 1337.13(D).
O5Summary of Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 1337.13(D), page 5.
2
"Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.08 et seq.
2
'Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.08.
2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.08(A)(l)(a).
2
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2) patient's spouse;
3) adult child(ren) or a majority thereof;
4) patient's parents;
5) adult sibling(s) or a majority thereof; or
6) nearest adult who is related to the patient by blood or adoption. 209

This section may only be activated if the court is satisfied that one of two
conditions are met. First, the court must be presented with sufficient evidence
demonstrating that the patient had previously expressed his wishes concerning the
continuation or withholding of life-sustaining treatment in the event the patient
became unable to make an informed decision. 210 In the alternative, the section would
become effective if the decision concerning life-sustaining treatment "is consistent
with the type of informed consent decision that the patient would have made if he
previously had expressed his intention... ."211 This decision can be "inferred from
the lifestyle and character of the patient, and from any other evidence of the desires
informed decisions
of the patient, prior to his becoming no longer able to make
212
treatment.
life-sustaining
of
administration
the
regarding
The No Document section also contains a provision consistent with the Living
Will section 2 3 regarding pregnant patients. 21 Treatment will only be withheld or
withdrawn from a pregnant patient if two doctors agree that the fetus would not be
born alive.215 Again, the court will not take into consideration the wishes of the
husband or family of the patient; the welfare of the fetus is paramount.
The legislature added specific conditions under which nutrition and hydration
may be withdrawn from patients who have been in a permanently unconscious state
for the preceding twelve months. 216 Nutrition and hydration can only be withdrawn
if one of the following conditions are satisfied:
1) written consent is given by appropriate individuals;
2) the Probate Court has not reversed the consent;
3) two doctors determine that nutrition or hydration will not provide
comfort or alleviate pain;
4) written consent is witnessed by two individuals and given to the doctor,
5) the informed consent would have been given by the patient if he were
competent to make it; or
' Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991)
*Am. Sub. S. B. 1, il9th Gen. Ass. (1991)
"'Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991)
212
Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991)
"'3Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991)
2
"Am. Sub. S. B. 1,119th Gen. Ass. (1991)
2t 5
Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991)
2 16
Am. Sub.
S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass.1991
Published
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(1991)
21

§ 2133.08(B).
§ 2133.08(D)(2).
§ 2133.08(D)(3).
§ 2133.08(D)(3).
§ 2133.06(B).
§ 2133.08(G).
§ 2133.08(G).
§ 2133.09.
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6) the Probate Court issues an order to withhold or withdraw the care.2 7
The legislature also added a provision which formally recognizes that a validly
executed document from another state is valid in Ohio. 21 Undersection 2133.14(A),
declarations executed anywhere prior to the effective date of this statute 21 9 will be
given effect as if they had been executed after the effective date of the statute.220 If
the declaration does not contain the requisite language that the patient desires that
nutrition orhydration be withdrawn or withheld, the attending physician must apply
to the Probate Court for an order authorizing this treatment. 22' While the legislature
has honorably chosen to recognize both out-of-state declarations and improperly
executed declarations, the legislature has unfortunately placed an additional burden
on the families of these patients to obtain a court order before treatment can be
terminated. The actual hearing under this section can take place "no sooner than the
thirtieth business day, and no later than the sixtieth business day" after the necessary
parties have received formal notice from the Probate Court. 2 22 Requiring families
to wait an additional thirty to sixty days may unnecessarily inflict undue financial
and emotional burdens.
Lastly, the new statute provides for an extensive appeal process under all three
sections: the Durable Power of Attorney; Living Will; and No Document. Under
the Durable Power of Attorney section, only persons in the two highest classes of the
hierarchy can appeal the decision. 223 The individuals appealing the decision must
notify the physician within two days and file their appeal within two business days
thereafter. 22 The Probate Court must then serve notice on all interested parties
within three days and hold a hearing within three business days thereafter. 2 25 The
226
statute requires the Probate Court to make an immediate decision.
The legislature also enumerated the grounds for appeal of the Probate Court's
decision under the Durable Power of Attorney section:
a)
2

the principal has not lost capacity to decide for himself;

"Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.09(A).
Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.14.
' October 10, 1991.
' 0 Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.15(A).
22
'Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.15(B)(1).
222
Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.15(B)(1).
2
'Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 1337.16(D). For example, if the patient has a guardian and
a spouse, then those persons from the two classes can appeal. If the patient has no guardian, then his spouse
and his adult children would form the two highest classes. No one other than the members from the two
highest classes can appeal, including the State of Ohio. [The hierarchy in descending order includes:
guardian, if any; spouse; adult children; parents; or adult siblings, or a majority thereof.]
' Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 1337.16(D).
'Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 1337.16(D).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)

there is a possibility that the principal will regain his capacity;
the decision is inconsistent with the desires of the principal or not in his
best interests;
the document is no longer effective;
the doctors' determination that the patient is terminal or in a permanently
unconscious state is inaccurate;
the decision pertaining to the use, or continuation, or the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is not authorized by the document;
the principal was not of sound mind or was under or subject to duress,
fraud, or undue influence;
227
the document does not substantially comply with the statute.

The burden of proof rests with the party objecting to the medical decision. The
objecting party must present clear and convincing evidence if the Probate Court's
decision concerns the use or continuance of life-sustaining treatment. 228 If the
party's objection concerns the decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment, then the opposing party must prove the grounds for objection by a
preponderance of the evidence.129 Thus, the declarant's wishes carry a greater
weight, and the party who seeks to overturn the declarant's wishes bears the heavier
burden.
The Living Will section utilizes the same appellate process as in the Durable
Power of Attorney section. 230 The legislature enumerated the following grounds for
appeal:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

22Am. Sub.
"'Am. Sub.
229
Am. Sub.
23Am. Sub.
Sub.
2'Am.

thedeclarantis notin a terminalcondition or in a permanently unconscious
state;
the declarant is able to make an informed decision;
there is a reasonable possibility that the declarant will regain the capacity
to make informed decisions;
the course of action proposed to be undertaken is not authorized by the
declarant's declaration;
the declarant was not of sound mind or was under duress, fraud, or undue
influence;
23
the declaration does not comply with the statute. '

S.
S.
S.
S.
S.

B.
B.
B.
B.
B.

1,
1,
1,
1,
1,

119th Gen. Ass.
119th Gen. Ass.
119th Gen. Ass.
119th Gen. Ass.
119th Gen. Ass.

(1991)
(1991)
(1991)
(1991)
(1991)
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§
§
§
§
§

1336.16(D)(4)(c).
1337.16(D)(6)(b).
1337.16(D)(6)(c).
2133.05(B)(1).
2133.05(B)(2)(c).
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The Living Will appeal process is similar to the Durable Power of Attorney
appeal process, except that the hierarchy is slightly different.2 32 Again, only those
members named in the first two classes of the hierarchy can appeal. Neither other
family members nor the State of Ohio can appeal the decision.2 33 The same standards
for burden of proof apply in this section as were established under the Durable Power
2
of Attorney section. 3
The legislature placed the fewest restrictions on the potential appellants under
the No Document section. 23 5 Under this section, any member of the classes named
in the hierarchy can appeal the decision. 236 The same appellate procedure and
burdens of proof apply as under the Durable Power of Attorney and Living Will
sections.

23 7

The elected officials worked over ten years to pass this legislation. The Ohio
statute comports with the Federal Patient Self-Determination Act which goes into
effect on December 1, 1991. Unfortunately, Am. Sub. S. B. 1 appears to be a
compromise. Sen. Montgomery's original bill was a strong and equitable proposal
for the citizens of Ohio. The amended bill allows egregious situations to occur. The
amended bill places the life of the fetus paramount to that of the patient and forces
a patient who has not executed documents to remain in a permanent unconscious
state for at least twelve months before treatment can be terminated. These
restrictions will probably form the basis of much litigation over the next few years.
Despite these major defects, this legislation is far superior to the former
Durable Power of Attorney statute. After October 10, 1991, a majority of the
individuals who have executed a Durable Power of Attorney or Living Will
document, as well as loved ones of those who have not, will be able to make their
own health care decisions. Their voices will be heard and their wishes will be
followed. At last, in Ohio, at least some patients will be allowed to die with dignity.
LINDA SHIELDS STIEFEL
"2 Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.05(A)(2)(i) and (ii). [Thus the hierarchy consists of
anyone the declarant named to make the decision; the declarant's guardian, if any; the declarant's spouse;
the declarant's adult children; the declarant's parents; or the declarant's adult siblings, ora majority thereof.]
2"Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.05(B)(3).

'Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.05(B)(4)(b) and (c).

25

" Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.08(E).
7'Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.08(B) provides that the hierarchy shall be:

a) the patient's guardian, if any;
b) the patient's spouse;
c) the patient's adult children, or a majority thereof;
d) the patient's parents;
e) the patient's adult siblings, or a majority thereof;
f) the patient's nearest relative by blood or adoption.
"Am. Sub. S. B. 1, 119th Gen. Ass. (1991) § 2133.08(E)(2) and (3).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (1989)
Section 1. DEFINITIONS. As used in this [Act], unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Attending physician" means the physician who has primary responsibility for the
treatment and care of the patient.
(2) "Declaration" means a writing executed in accordance with the requirements of
Section 2(a).
(3) "Health-care provider" means a person who is licensed, certified, or otherwise
authorized by the law of this State to administer health care in the ordinary course of
business or practice of a profession.
(4) "Life-sustaining treatment" means any medical procedure or intervention that, when
administered to a qualified patient, will serve only to prolong the process of dying.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any
other legal or commercial entity.
(6) "Physician" means an individual [licensed to practice medicine in this State].
(7) "Qualified patient" means a patient [181 or more years of age who has executed a
declaration and who has been determined by the attending physician to be in a terminal
condition.
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
(9) "Terminal condition" means an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the
administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinioV of the attending physician,
result in death within a relatively short time.
COMMENT
The Act's definitions of "life-sustaining treatment" and "terminal condition" are interdependent and must be read together. This has caused
drafting problems in many existing acts. and
the Act has been drafted to avoid the problems
detected in existing legislation.
Most of the "life-sustaining treatment" and
"terminal condition" definitions in existing statutes were considered problematical in that they
(1) were tautological. defining "terminal condition" with respect to "life-sustaining treatment"
and vice versa, and (2)defined terminal condition as requiring "imminent" death "whether
or not" or "regardless of" the application of
life-sustaining treatment. Strictly speaking, if
death is "imminent" even with the full application of life-sustaining treatment, there is little
point in having a statute permitting withdrawal
of such procedures. The Act's definitions have
attempted to avoid these problems.
The "life-sustaining treatment" definition
found in many statutes inserts the clause "and
when. in the judgment of the attending physician, death will occur whether or not such procedure or intervention is utilized," after the
phrase "will serve only to prolong the dying
process" found in the Act's provision. Because

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8

the Act's life-sustaining treatment definition
concerns only those procedures or interventions applied to "qualified patients" (i.e., those
who have been determined to be in a terminal
condition), and because a terminal condition is
defined as "incurable and irreversible" with
death resulting "in a relatively short time." the
requirement that death be "inevitable" has been
satisfied by the presence of "qualified patient"
in the life-sustaining treatment definition.
Therefore. this additional clause was excluded
because it was considered repetitious and possibly confusing.
The Act defines "life-sustaining treatment"
in an all-inclusive manner, dealing with those
procedures necessary for comfort care or alleviation of pain separately in Section 61b). where
it is provided that such procedures need not be
withdrawn or withheld pursuant to a declaration. Most existing statutes incorporate "comfort care" as an exclusion from the definition of
life-sustaining treatment. Because many such
procedures are life-sustaining, however, the Act
avoids definitional confusion by treating them
in a separate provision that reflects the Act's
policy more clearly, and better reflects the fact
that comfort care does not involve a fixed group
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of procedures applicable in all instances.
Subsection (9)of Section 1 is the "terminal
condition" definition. The difficulty of trying to
express such a condition in precise, accurate,
but not unduly restricting language is obvious.
A definition must preserve the physicians' professional discretion in making such determinations. Consequently, the Act's definition of terminal condition incorporates not only selected
language from various state acts, but also suggestions from medical literature in the field.
The Act employs the term "terminal condition" rather than terminal illness, and it is important that these two different concepts be
distinguished. Terminal illness, as generally understood, is both broader and narrower than
terminal condition. Terminal illness connotes a
disease process that will lead to death; "terminal condition" is not limited to disease. "Terminal illness" also connotes an inevitable process
leading to death, but does not contain limitations as to the time period prior to death, or
potential for nonreversibility. as does "terminal
condition."
The terminal condition definition requires
that the condition be "incurable and irreversible." These adjectives were chosen over the
similar phrase, "no possibility of recovery," because of possible ambiguity in the term "recovery" (i.e., recovery to "normal" or to some other
stage). A number of state statutes now use
"incurable" and/or "irreversible." and the terms
appear to comport with the criteria applied by
physicians in terminal care situations. The
phrase "incurable and irreversible" is to be read
conjunctively as long as the circumstances warrant. A condition which is reversible but incurable is not a terminal condition.
Subsection (9)also requires that the condition result in the death of the patient with a
"relatively short time ...without the administration of life-sustaining treatment." This requirement differs to some degree from the language employed in most of the statutes. First.
the decision that death will occur in a relatively
short time is to be made without considering
the possibilities of extending life with lifesustaining treatment. The alternative is that
required by a number of states-that death be
imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are applied. The President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical Research has noted that such a
definition severely limits the group of termi-

nally-ill patients able to qualify under these
acts. It is precisely because life can be prolonged indefinitely by new medical technology
that these acts have come into existence.
Though the Act intends to err on the side -of
prolonging life, it should not be made wholly
ineffective as to the actual situation it purports
to address. The provisions which require that
death be imminent regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures appear to have
that effect. Therefore, such provisions have
been excluded in the Act.
The terminal condition definition of subsection 19) requires that death result "in a relatively short time." Rejecting the "imminency"
language employed in a number of statutes,
this alternative was chosen because it provides
needed flexibility and reflects the balancing
character of the time frame judgment. Though
the phrase. "relatively short time," does not
eliminate the need for judgment, it focuses the
physician's medical judgment and avoids the
narrowing implications of the word "imminent."
The "relatively short time" formulation is
employed to avoid both the unduly constricting meaning of "imminent" and the artificiality
of another alternative-fixed time periods,
such as six months, one year. or the like. The
circumstances and inevitable variations in disorder and diagnosis make unrealistic a fixed
time period. Physicians may be hesitant to
make predictions under a fixed time period
standard unless the standard of physician judgment is so loose as to be unenforceable. Under
the Act's standard, considerations such as the
strength of the diagnosis, the type of disorder,
and the like can be reflected in the judgment
that death will result within a relatively short
time. as they are now reflected in judgments
physicians must and do make.
The life-sustaining treatment and terminal
condition definitions exclude certain types of
disorders, such as kidney disease requiring dialysis, and diabetes requiring continued use of
insulin. This is accomplished in the requirement that terminal conditions be "irreversible,"
and that life-sustaining procedures serve "only
to prolong the dying process." For purposes of
the Act, diabetes treatable with insulin is "reversible," a diabetic person so treatable is not
in the "dying process," and insulin is a treatment the benefits of which foreclose it serving
.only" to prolong the dying process.

Section 2. Declaration Relating to Use of Life-Sustaining Treatment.
(a) An individual of sound mind and 118J or more years of age may execute at any time a
declaration governing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. The
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2

declarant may designate another individual of sound mind and [181 or more years of age to
make decisions governing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. The
declaration must be signed by the declarant, or another at the declarant's direction, and
witnessed by two individuals.
(b) A declaration directing a physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment may, but need not, be in the following form:
DECLARATION
If I should have an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of my attending physician, cause
my death within a relatively short time, and I am no longer able to make decisions
regarding my medical treatment, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of this State, to withhold or withdraw
treatment that only prolongs the process of dying and is not necessary for my comfort
or to alleviate pain.
Signed this

day of

Signature
Address
The declarant voluntarily signed this writing in my presence.
Witness
Address
Witness
Address
(c) A declaration that designates another individual to make decisions governing the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment may, but need not, be in the following
form:
DECLARATION
If I should have an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of my attending physician, cause
my death within a relatively short time, and I am no longer able to make decisions
or, if he or she is not
regarding my medical treatment, I appoint
,, to make decisions

reasonably available or is unwilling to serve.

on my behalf regarding withholding or withdrawal of treatment that only prolongs the
process of dying and is not necessary for my comfort or to alleviate pain, pursuant to the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of this State.
[If the individual(s) I have so appointed is not reasonably available or is unwilling
to serve, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to the Uniform Rights of the
Trminally Ill Act of this State, to withhold or withdraw treatment that only prolongs
the process of dying and is not necessary for my comfort or to alleviate pain.]
Strike out bracketed language if you do not desire it.
Signed this

day of

,

Signature
Address
The declarant voluntarily signed this writing in my presence.
Witness
Address
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8
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Witness
ft~laress

Name and address of designee.
Name
Address
(d) The designation of an attorney-in-fact (pursuant to the Uniform Durable Power of
Attorney Act or the Model Health-Care Consent Act], or the judicial appointment of an
individual (guardian], who is authorized to make decisions regarding the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, constitutes for purposes of this (Act] a declaration
designating another individual to act for the declarant pursuant to subsection (a).
(e) A physician or other health-care provider who is furnished a copy of the declaration
shall make it a part of the declarant's medical record and, if unwilling to comply with the
declaration, promptly so advise the declarant and any individual designated to act for the
declarant.

COMMENT
Section 2 sets out the minimal requirements
regarding the making and execution of a valid
declaration. "Sample" declaration forms are offered in this section. The forms are not mandatory, as some acts require; they "may. but need
not, be" followed. The forms provided also are
not as elaborate as others. The drafters rejected
more detailed declarations for two reasons.
First. the forms are to serve only as examples of
a valid declaration. More elaborate forms may
have erroneously implied that a declaration
more simply constructed would not be legally
sufficient. Second. the sample forms' simple
structure and specific language attempt to provide notice of exactly what is to be effectuated
through these documents to those persons desiring to execute a declaration and the physicians who are to honor it.
Sections 2(a) and (cI of the Act authorize an
individual by a declaration to designate another person to make decisions governing the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
care. The designated person must be an adult
of sound mind, but no other restrictions are
placed on the designation other than the requirements of form contained in Section 2(a).
The designated person may be an attorney-infact who is so designated in the declaration or
in another writing that conforms with the applicable requirements of each state for durable
powers of attorney.
Section 2(c) provides a model form of declaration by which the designation of another
decision-maker may be accomplished. The
bracketed language in the Section 2(c) form of
declaration is intended to allow a declarant two
choices when designating another person to
make treatment decisions. Frst, by striking
the bracketed language, an individual may

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991

make an exclusive designation of another
decision-maker, and if that person is not available to fulfill the responsibility, the declaration
will have no effect. It is intended, in such an
event, that the substituted decision-makers
who are authorized to make treatment decisions in Section 7 will be able to exercise
decision-making authority pursuant to the
terms of Section 7. The execution of a declaration exclusively designating another person to
make treatment decisions, in other words,
should not itself be construed as an "expressed
intention of the individual" not to have lifesustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn
under Section 7(dL.
The second choice available in the Section
2(c) form of declaration would make the declaration directly effective by its terms in the event
that the substituted decision-maker were unavailable. This would be accomplished by not
striking the bracketed language.
Other than the requirement that designees
be adults of sound mind. no limitation is placed
in Section 2 on the person(s) who may be designated to make decisions about the withholding
or withdrawal of treatment for the declarant. It
is specifically anticipated, for example, that
some people may choose to appoint their physician to make such decisions and. absent any
ethical restrictions on such an appointment.
Section 2 anticipates that the physician may
act in the appointed capacity.
Persons may be appointed to make decisions
for a declarant through a declaration in substantially the form contained in Section 2(c).
through appointment of an attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney, or through
a judicially appointed guardian. In all cases,
the designee has full power to make the rle-
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vant decisions called for in the Act, and functions as the agent of the declarant. No specific
standards, other than good faith, apply to decisions of the designee. Designation of another to
make decisions pursuant to a durable power of
attorney or judicially-appointed guardianship
is treated as a declaration under the Act, so
that, for example, decisions of the designee
"govern" treatment decisions by the physician,
and a physician who is unwilling to abide by
such decisions (if medically reasonable) must
transfer the patient to the care of another
physician.
Designation by a durable power of attorney
or judicially-appointed guardianship must be
based on a sufficiently specific reference to
health care or terminal care treatment decisions, as required by state law governing such
appointments, to trigger application of the Act.
No specific formulation of the terms of appointment is required, however. If appointment for
purposes of health-care decisions would be sufficient under state law to include withholding or
withdrawal of treatment for a person in a terminal condition, that will suffice under the Act.
The Act's authorization for specific decisions
does not in any way restrict authority that
exists under state law. The Act is in this respect
additive only. Thus, for example. if an attorneyin-fact would have the authority independent
of this Act to authorize withdrawal of treatment for a person in a persistent vegetative
state not covered by the terms of the Act, the
Act's limitations would not circumscribe the
attorney-in-fact's authority under other law.
In designating another person to make treatment decisions, it is assumed that a declarant
will identify only a single decision-maker. In
view of this assumption, Sections 2(a) and (c)
permit designation of an individual,rather than
individuals, as the problems associated with
identifying, locating, and communicating with
multiple decision-makers are substantial and
the drafters did not want to encourage the
practice.
The Act does not expressly prohibit multiple
designees, however, and a declaration containing a multiple designation is not invalid under
the Act. The absence of any provision permitting a majority of such designees to act in the
case of a disagreement, however, means that
the refusal of one member of a designee group
to agree to direct the withholding or withdrawal
of treatment will foreclose any action under the
Act unless the declaration specifically provides
otherwise. Because of the difficulties associated with multiple designees under the Act,
declarants should be discouraged from the practice and, if such designations are made and any
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result other than the one stated above is desired, the declaration should so specify.
The Act's provisions governing witnesses to
a declaration are simplified. Section 2 provides
only that the declaration be signed by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses. The
Act does not require witnesses to meet any
specific qualifications for two primary reasons.
First, the interest in simplicity mandates as
uncomplicated a procedure as possible. It is
intended that the Act present a viable alternative for those persons interested in participating in their medical treatment decisions in the
event of a terminal condition.
Second. the absence of more elaborate witness requirements relieves physicians of the
inappropriate and perhaps impossible burden
of determining whether the legalities of the
witness requirements have been met. Many
physicians understandably and rightly would
be hesitant to make such decisions and, therefore, the effectiveness of the declaration might
be jeopardized. It should be noted, as well, that
protection against abuse in these situations is
provided by the criminal penalties in Section
10. The attending physicians and other healthcare professionals will be able, in most circumstances, to discuss the declaration with the
patient and family and any suspicion of duress
or wrongdoing can be discovered and handled
by established hospital procedures.
Section 2(e) requires that a physician or
health-care provider who is given a copy of the
declaration record it in the declarant's medical
records. This step is critical to the effectuation
of the declaration, and the duty applies regardless of the time of receipt. If a copy of the same
declaration is already in the record, its rerecording would not be necessary, but its receipt should be noted as evidence of its continued force. Section 21e) is not duplicative of
Section 5 which requires recording the terms of
the declaration (or the document itself, when
available, in the event of telephonic communication to the physician by another physician.
for example) at the time the physician makes a
determination of terminal condition. It was
deemed important that knowledge of the declaration and its continued force be specifically
noted at this critical juncture.
Section 2(e) imposes a duty on the physician
or other health-care provider to inform the declarant of his or her unwillingness to comply
with the provisions of the declaration. This will
provide notice to the declarant that certain terms
may be deemed medically unreasonable ISection
11(f)), or that the declarant should decide whether to select another attending physician who
is willing to carry out the Act (Section 8).
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Section 3. When Declaration Operative. A declaration becomes operative when (i) it is
communicated to the attending physician and (ii) the declarant is determined by the
attending physician to be in a terminal condition and no longer able to make decisions
regarding administration of life-sustaining treatment. When the declaration becomes operative, the attending physician and other health-care providers shall act in accordance with its
provisions and with the instructions of a designee under Section 2(a) or comply with the
transfer requirements of Section 8.
COMMENT
Section 3 establishes the preconditions to to relieve the physician from carrying out the
the declaration becoming operative. Once oper. declaration except for any specific unreasonative, Section 3 provides that the attending able or unlawful request in the declaration.
physician shall act in accordance with the pro- Transfer of the patient under Section 8 is to
visions of the declaration or transfer care of the occur if the physician, for reasons of conscience,
patient under Section 8. This provision is not for example, is unwilling to carry out the Act or
intended to eliminate the physician's need to to follow medically reasonable requests in the
evaluate particular requests in terms of reason- declaration.
able medical practice under Section lIlIf) nor
Section 4. Revocation of Declaration.
(a) A declarant may revoke a declaration at any time and in any manner, without regard
to the declarant's mental or physical condition. A revocation is effective upon its communication to the attending physician or other health-care provider by the declarant or a witness
to the revocation.
(b) The attending physician or other health-care provider shall make the revocation a
part of the declarant's medical record.
COMMENT
Section 4 provides for revocation of a declaration and is modeled after North Carolina's
similar provision. Virtually every other statute
sets out specific examples of how a declaration
can be revoked-by physical destruction, by a
signed, dated writing, or by a verbal expression of revocation. A provision that freely allowed revocation and avoided procedural complications was desired. The simple language of
Section 4 appears to meet these qualifications.
It should be noted that the revocation is, of
course, not effective until communicated to the
attending physician or another health-care provider working under a physician's guidance.
such as nursing facility or hospice staff. The

Act. unlike many statutes, also does not explicitly require that a person relaying the revocation be acting on the declarant's behalf. Such a
requirement could impose an unreasonable burden on the attending physician. The communication is assumed to be in good faith, and the
physician may rely on it.
In employing a general revocation provision.
it was intended to permit revocation by the
broadest range of means. Therefore. for example. it is intended that a revocation can be
effected in writing, orally, by physical defacement or destruction of a declaration, and by
physician sign communicating intention to
revoke.

Section 5. Recording Determination of Terminal Condition and Declaration. Upon
determining that a declarant is in a terminal condition, the attending physician who knows of
a declaration shall record the determination and the terms of the declaration in the declarant's medical record.
COMMENT
Section 5 of the Act requires that an attending physician record the determination that the
patient is in a terminal condition in the pa-

through oral communication between physicians. If the attending physician determines
that the patient is in a terminal condition, and

tient's medical records. The section provides

has been notified of the declaration, the physi-

that an attending physician must know of the
declaration's existence. It is anticipated that
knowledge may in some instances occur

cian is to make the determination of terminal
condition, as defined in Section 1(8), part of the
patient's medical records. There is no explicit
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requirement that the physician inform the patient of the terminal condition. That decision is
to be left to the physician's professional discretion under existing standards of care. The Act
also does not require, as do many statutes, that
a physician other than the attending physician
concur in the terminal condition determination. It appears to be the established practice of
most physicians to request a second opinion or.
more often, review by a panel or committee
established as a matter of hospital procedure,
and the Act is not intended to discourage such
a practice. Requiring it. however, would almost
inevitably freeze in a single process or set of
processes for review in this evolving area of
medicine. Because existing policies and regulations typically address the review issue, requiring a specific form of review in the Act was
viewed as an unnecessary regulation of normal

[Vol. 24:3 & 4
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hospital procedures. Moreover, in smaller or
rural health facilities a second qualified physician or review mechanism may not be readily
available to confirm the attending physician's
determination.
The physician must record the terms of the
declaration in the medical record so that its
specific language or any special provisions are
known at later stages of treatment. It is assumed that "terms" of the declaration will be a
copy of the declaration itself in most instances,
although cases of an emergency character may
arise, for example, in which the contents of a
declaration can be reliably conveyed, and where
obtaining a copy of the declaration prior to
making decisions governed by it will be impracticable. In such cases, the terms of the declaration will suffice for recording purposes under
Section 5.

Section 6. Treatment of Qualified Patients.
(a) A qualified patient may make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment so long
as the patient is able to do so.
(b) This [Act] does not affect the responsibility of the attending physician or other
health-care provider to provide treatment, including nutrition and hydration, for a patient's
comfort care or alleviation of pain.
(c) Life-sustaining treatment must not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an individual known to the attending physician to be pregnant so long as it is
probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with continued application of
life-sustaining treatment.
COMMENT
Section 6(a) recognizes the right of patients
who have made a declaration and are determined to be in a terminal condition to make
decisions regarding use of life-sustaining procedures. Until unable to do so. such patients have
the right to make such decisions independently
of the terms of the declaration. In affording
patients a "right to make decisions regarding
use of life-sustaining procedures," the Act is
intended to reflect existing law pertaining to
this issue. As Sections 11(e) and (f) indicate,
qualifications on a patient's right to force the
carrying out of those decisions in a manner
contrary to law or accepted standards of medical practice, for example, are not intended to be
overridden.
In Section 6(b) the Act uses the term "comfort care" in defining procedures that may be
applied notwithstanding a declaration instructing withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
treatment. The purpose for permitting continuation of life-sustaining treatment deemed necessary for comfort care or alleviation of pain is
to allow the physician to take appropriate steps

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/8

to insure corpfort and freedom from pain, as
dictated by reasonable medical standards.
Many existing statutes employ the term "comfort care" in connection with the alleviation of
pain. and the Act follows this example. Although the phrase "to alleviate pain" arguably
is subsumed within the term comfort care, the
additional specificity was considered helpful
for both the doctor and layperson.
Section 61b) does not set out a separate rule
governing the provision of nutrition and hydration. Instead. each is subject to the same considerations of necessity for comfort care and
alleviation of pain as are all other forms of
life-sustaining treatment. If nutrition and hydration are not necessary for comfort care or
alleviation of pain. they may be withdrawn.
This approach was deemed preferable to the
approach in a few existing statutes, which treat
nutrition and hydration as comfort care in all
cases, regardless of circumstances, and exclude
comfort care from the life-sustaining treatment
definition.
It is debatable whether physicians or other
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professionals perceive the providing of nourishment through intravenous feeding apparatus or nasogastric tubes as comfort care in all
cases or whether such procedures at times
merely prolong the dying process. Whether procedures to provide nourishment should be considered life-sustaining treatment or comfort
care appears to depend on the factual circumstances of each case and, therefore, such decisions should be left to the physician, exercising
reasonable medical judgment. Declarants may,
however, specifically express their views regarding continuation or noncontinuation of such
procedures in the declaration, and those views
will control.
Section 61c) addresses the problem of a qualified patient who is pregnant. The states which
address this issue typically require that the
declaration be given no force or effect during
the pregnancy. Because this requirement inadvertently may do more harm than good to the
fetus, Section 6(c) provides a more suitable, if
more complicated, standard. It is possible to
hypothesize a situation in which life-sustaining
treatment, such as medication. may prove fatal
to a fetus which is at or near the point of viability outside the womb. In such cases, the Act's
provision would permit the life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn or withheld as appropriate in order best to assure survival of the fetus.
Also, for example, if the qualified patient is
only a few weeks pregnant and the physician,
pursuant to reasonable medical judgment, determines that it is not probable that the fetus

could develop to a point of viability outside the
womb even with application of life-sustaining
treatment, such treatment may also be withheld or withdrawn. Thus, the pregnancy provision attempts to honor the terminally-ill patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
without jeopardizing the likelihood of life for
the fetus.
In the original Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act, adopted by the Conference in 1985, Section 6(c) included the introductory phrase "Unless the declaration otherwise provides." In the
current Act the phrase has been eliminated
from Section 6(c) in order to conform with a
similar provision in Section 7. Under the current provision, life-sustaining treatment may
not be withdrawn from a woman known to be
pregnant if it is probable that the fetus will
develop to live birth with continuation of the
treatment, notwithstanding expressed views of
the patient to the contrary. In view of the requirement that development to birth be proba-.
ble, and the frequently complicating impact of
prolonged life-sustaining treatment for a terminal patient, the provision is likely to have an
impact in relatively narrow circumstances.
Nevertheless, in states that wish to accommodate the declaration of a pregnant woman,
the wording from the prior version of the Act
may be used. Differences from the Uniform Act
in this specific application would not undermine the interest in uniformity served by the
Act.

Section 7. Consent by Others to Withdrawal or Withholding of Treatment.
(a) If written consent to the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment, witnessed by
two individuals, is given to the attending physician, the attending physician may withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an individual who:
(1) has been determined by the attending physician to be in a terminal condition and
no longer able to make decisions regarding administration of life-sustaining treatment; and
(2) has no effective declaration.
(b) The authority to consent or to withhold consent under subsection (a) may be
exercised by the following individuals, in order of priority:
(1) the spouse of the individual;
(2) an adult child of the individual or, if there is more than one adult child, a majority
of the adult children who are reasonably available for consultation;
(3) the parents of the individual;
(4) an adult sibling of the individual or, if there is more than one adult sibling, a
majority of the adult siblings who are reasonably available for consultation; or
(5) the nearest other adult relative of the individual by blood or adoption who is
reasonably available for consultation.
(c) If a class entitled to decide whether to consent is not reasonably available for
consultation and competent to decide, or declines to decide, the next class is authorized to
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decide, but an equal division in a class does not authorize the next class to decide.
(d) A decision to grant or withhold consent must be made in good faith. A consent is not
valid if it conflicts with the expressed intention of the individual.
(e) A decision of the attending physician acting in good faith that a consent is valid or
invalid is conclusive.
(f) Life-sustaining treatment must not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to this
section from an individual known to the attending physician to be pregnant so long as it is
probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with continued application of
life-sustaining treatment.
COMMENT
Section 7 provides a procedure by which an
attending physician may obtain consent to the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment in the absence of an effective declaration. It draws upon the definitions of the Act,
as well as those sections bearing on the process
for and the legal effect of withholding or withdrawal of treatment, but in most other respects
it is free-standing. It can therefore simply be
inserted as a new section in existing statutes
that follow the original 1985 Uniform Act. For
states that might want to adopt the Section 2
amendments. but not the Section 7 amendments. Section 7 can simply be deleted.
The purpose of Section 7 is to authorize persons other than the patient who are in a close
familial relationship to the patient to consent to
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment when the patient has no prior declaration, or when a prior declaration is not effective. Prior declarations might not be effective
for a variety of reasons, including for example
the expiration of a time limit, the failure to have
the declaration properly witnessed, or the absence of a condition precedent contained in the
declaration, such as the death or disability of a
designated decision-maker.
Section 7 authorizes binding consent to the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining

treatment for qualified patients. Members of
the patient's family in designated priority order
may consent to withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment, and such consent will
be treated as if the individual had given it.
Consent by the designated family members.
however, must be given in good faith, and is not
valid if it would conflict with the expressed
intention of the patient.
The consent provision of Section 7 differs
from the designation of another to make decisions under Section 2. Because the "consent"
does not constitute a declaration under the Act.
provisions that impose an obligation on the
physician to seek out a designee under a declaration, that make the designee's decisions "govern" treatment, and that require transfer by a
physician under Section 8, do not apply. Section 7. in short, is not a full alternative to a
declaration, but is rather a means by which the
attending physician can obtain legally reliable
consent to the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment for individuals in a terminal condition. should that be needed in the circumstances. Section 7 neither constitutes a de jure
appointment of family to make such decisions
in all cases, nor does it limit treatment authority authorized under other law.

Section 8. Transfer of Patients. An attending physician or other health-care provider
who is unwilling to comply with this [Act] shall take all reasonable steps as promptly as
practicable to transfer care of the declarant to another physician or health-care provider who
is willing to do so.
COMMENT
Section 8 is designed to address situations in
which a physician or health-care provider is

victions or policies unrelated to medical judgment called for under the Act. In such in-

unwilling to make and record a determination
of terminal condition, or to respect the medi.
cally reasonable decisions of the patient or designee regarding withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures, due to personal con-

stances, the physician or health-care provider
must promptly take all reasonable steps to
transfer the patient to another physician or
health-care provider who will comply with the
applicable provisions of the Act.
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Immunities.

{a) A physician or other health-care provider is not subject to civil or criminal liability,
or discipline for unprofessional conduct, for giving effect to a declaration or the direction of
an individual designated pursuant to Section 2(a) in the absence of knowledge of the
revocation of a declaration, or for giving effect to a written consent under Section 7.
(b) A physician or other health-care-provider, whose action under this [Act] is in accord
with reasonable medical standards, is not subject to criminal or civil liability, or discipline
for unprofessional conduct, with respect to that action.
(c) A physician or other health-care provider, whose decision about the validity of
consent under Section 7 is made in good faith, is not subject to criminal or civil liability, or
discipline for unprofessional conduct, with respect to that decision.
(d) An individual designated pursuant to Section 2(a) or an individual authorized to
consent pursuant to Section 7, whose decision is made or consent is given in good faith
pursuant to this [Act], is not subject to criminal or civil liability, or discipline for unprofessional conduct, with respect to that decision.
COMMENT
Section 9 provides immunities for persons to immunize physicians from liability as long
acting pursuant to the declaration and in accor- as reasonable medical judgment is exercised.
dance with the Act. Immunities are extended and to impose "reasonable medical standards"
in Sections 9(abc) to physicians as well as as the criterion that should govern all of the
persons operating under the physician's direc- specific medical decisions called for throughout
tion or with the physician's authorization, to the Act. Section 9(b). in conjunction with Secfacilities in which the withholding or with- tion 11(f). therefore, avoids the need to restate
drawal of life-sustaining procedures occurs, and the medical standard in each section of the Act
to designees or persons authorized to consent requiring a medical judgment.
under Sections 2 or 7. Section 9(b) serves both
Section 10. Penalties.
(a) A physician or other health-care provider who willfully fails to transfer the care of a
patient in accordance with Section 8 is guilty of [a class
misdemeanorI.
(b) A physician who willfully fails to record a determination of terminal condition or the
terms of a declaration in accordance with Section 5 is guilty of [a class
misdemeanorl.
(c) An individual who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, or obliterates the declaration
of another individual without the declarant's consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of
the declaration of another individual is guilty of [a class
misdemeanorl.
(d) An individual who falsifies or forges the declaration of another individual, or
willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a revocation under Section 4, is guilty
of [a class _
misdemeanorI.
(e) A person who requires or prohibits the execution of a declaration as a condition for
being insured for, or receiving, health-care services is guilty of [a class__
misdemeanor].
(f) A person who coerces or fraudulently induces an individual to execute a declaration is
guilty of [a class
misdemeanor].
(g) The penalties provided in this section do not displace any sanction applicable under
other law.
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COMMENT
Section 10 provides criminal penalties for
specific conduct that violates the Act. Subsections (a) and (b) provide that a physician's failure to transfer a patient or record the diagnosis
of terminal condition constitutes a misdemeanor. Subsection (cI) makes certain willful actions which could result in the unauthorized
prolongation of life a misdemeanor. Subsection
(d) governs acts which are intended to cause the
unauthorized withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment, thereby advancing
death. Subsections (e) and (f) concern situations that may be coercive, and therefore are
against public policy.
Some of the criminal penalties- particularly
subsection (d)-depart significantly from most
existing statutes. Most statutes provide penalties for intentional conduct that actually causes
the death of a'declarant, and define such con-

duct as murder or a high degree felony. The Act
does not take this approach. Assuming that
such conduct will already be covered by a state's
criminal statutes, the Act only addresses the
situations in which the actor falsifies or forges
the declaration of another or willfully conceals
or withholds knowledge of revocation. To be
criminally sanctioned as a misdemeanor under
the Act the circumscribed conduct need not
cause the death of a declarant. The approach
taken by most states, that of providing a felony
penalty for those acts that actually caused
death, was considered unnecessary, as existing
criminal law will also apply pursuant to Section
101g). A specific penalty for the conduct described in Section 101d). however, was deemed
appropriate, as existing criminal codes may
not adequately address it.

Section 11. MisceUaneous Provisions.
(a) Death resulting from the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in
accordance with this [Act] does not constitute, for any purpose, a suicide or homicide.
(b) The making of a declaration pursuant to Section 2 does not affect the sale, procurement, or issuance of a policy of life insurance or annuity, nor does it affect, impair, or modify
the terms of an existing policy of life insurance or annuity. A policy of life insurance or
annuity is not legally impaired or invalidated by the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment from an insured, notwithstanding any term to the contrary.
(c) A person may not prohibit or require the execution of a declaration as a condition for
being insured for, or receiving, health-care services.
(d) This [Act] creates no presumption concerning the intention of an individual who has
revoked or has not executed a declaration with respect to the use, withholding, or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment in the event of a terminal condition.
(el This [Act] does not affect the right of a patient to make decisions regarding use of
life-sustaining treatment, so long as the patient is able to do so, or impair or supersede a right
or responsibility that a person has to effect the withholding or withdrawal of medical care.
(f) This [Act] does not require a physician or other health-care provider to take action
contrary to reasonable medical standards.
(g) This [Act] does not condone, authorize, or approve mercy-killing or euthanasia.
Section 12. When Health-Care Provider May Presume Validity of Declaration. In the
absence of knowledge to the contrary, a physician or other health-care provider may assume
that a declaration complies with this [Act] and is valid.
Section 13. Recognition of Declaration Executed in Another State.
A declaration
executed in another state in compliance with the law of that state or of this State is valid for
purposes of this [Act].
COMMENT
Section 13 provides that a declaration exe- tary), is to be treated as validly executed in the
cuted in another state, which meets the enacting state, but its operation in the enacting
execution requirements of that other state or state shall be subject to the substantive polithe enacting state (adult, two witnesses, volun- cies in the enacting state's law.
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Section 14. Effect of Previous Declaration. An instrument executed anywhere before
the effective date of this [Actl which substantially complies with Section 2(a) is effective
under this [Act].
Section 15. Uniformity of Application and Construction. This [Act] shall be applied
and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this [Act] among states enacting it.
Section 16. Short Title.
nally Il Act (1989).

This [Act) may be cited as the Uniform Rights of the Termi-

Section 17. Severability Clause. If any provision of this [Act] or its application to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or
applications of this [Act] which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act) are severable.
Section 18.

Effective Date.

Section 19.

Repeal. The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:

(1)

This [Act] takes effect on

(2)
(3)
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